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Abstract 
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
concerns about the future role of NATO have unleashed a substantial debate among 
U.S. foreign policy experts and think tank analysts. In performing a qualitative content 
analysis, this paper comprehends and analyzes the unfolding discussion about the 
role of NATO currently conducted in the United States.  
In the policy-making process, think tanks are assumed to perform a double function. 
They shape the contents of a policy-relevant issue by advancing distinctive policy 
recommendations, and simultaneously carve out areas for consensus-building prior 
to the decisionmaking process. Accordingly, the first step of the analysis 
comprehends their approach, against which the line of argument regarding NATO as 
well as the policy recommendations are outlined. The prevailing issues of burden-
sharing and NATO enlargement furthermore provide a guideline that leads through 
the analysis. In a second step, major differences and overlaps between the camps 
are identified in order to carve out trends that are likely to prevail in future NATO 
politics.  
In the ensuing debate about NATO, four camps can be distinguished: libertarian, 
neoconservative, conservative, and liberal. While these camps outline distinct policy 
options, especially conservatives and liberals share the common objective of 
maintaining NATO well into the future. However, despite this commonly pursued 
goal, both camps remain skeptical towards NATO as a multilateral security 
organization and rather adopt an ‘instrumentalist’ view of NATO that is likely to 
extend into the future.  
In focusing on the input provided by think tanks concerning a particular policy debate, 
rather than the outcome of specific policies, this analysis also addresses an 
insufficiently-researched area of foreign policymaking and identifies implications for 
follow-up studies.  
 
 
Specifics of Quotation 
 
The directory for literature is divided into a bibliography and a list of electronic 
sources, since a major part of the analyzed material is published on the web. Articles 
and monographs published in the same year by the same author are marked with 
lower case letters (e.g. Boot 2003a). Material published on the internet in the same 
year by the same author is marked with capital letters in order to avoid footnoting all 
respective websites, which can be found in the directory (e.g. Boot 2003A, online; 
Boot 2003B, online). 
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1. Introduction 
 
“American foreign policy at any times can 
only be understood with reference to its 
domestic sources.”1 
 
In June 2004, the international conference ‘The U.S.A. as a World Power,’ held by 
the Evangelische Akademie Loccum in cooperation with the American Institute for 
Contemporary German Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 
revolved around the questions as to what principles guide U.S. foreign policy and 
how to deal with the United States’ current position as the world’s only remaining 
superpower. In this context, one of the main issues was the question of whether there 
is still a common transatlantic agenda for Europe and the United States in meeting 
current security challenges, especially since September 11, 2001, and the ensuing 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to what extent the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) will remain useful to help work on this agenda.  
This question also seems to be emblematic for the current debate in transatlantic 
relations that are widely perceived to be in ‘crisis.’2 While this debate predates ‘9/11,’3 
it has gained momentum ever since, as the 9/11 attacks are presumed to have 
unleashed what is starkly defined as the “Bush Revolution in foreign policy.”4 On the 
European side of the Atlantic, the United States is continuously charged with 
reproaches of an ever-increasing ‘unilateralism’ and defiance of multinational 
organizations and international law.5 In the United States, meanwhile, it seems to 
have become fashionable to mock at European ‘weakness’ and deficiencies to cope 
with ‘real world’ problems. While some scholars in the United States seem to have 
drawn the final conclusion that Americans and Europeans are from different planets,6 
in Europe, a “European response to the American challenge”7 is being called for. 
Both sides seem increasingly doubtful about the possibilities to formulate a new set 
                                                 
1 Schweigler 2003, 57. 
2 Haftendorn speaks in this context of a transatlantic “estrangement,” Haftendorn 2003, 267. As Busse puts it: 
„What the hell happened to transatlantic relations? (…) Der kundige Beobachter erkennt erschreckt, dass nichts 
mehr so ist, wie es einmal war.“ Busse 2003, 19. A more comprehensive conceptualization of this observation 
has not yet been developed. 
3 On account of issues on the transatlantic agenda predating 9/11, see Everts 2001; Haftendorn 2003. 
4 Daalder/Lindsay 2003b. See also Rudolf, who understands 9/11 more generally as a “transformative moment” 
for U.S. foreign policy, Rudolf 2002, 7. 
5 Everts 2001, 16. 
6 Kagan 2002B, online. 
7 Busse 2003, 23, translation K.K. 
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of ‘strategic bargains’ in meeting today’s security challenges.8 Thus, Europe and the 
United States find themselves in “a second post-Cold War period of strategic 
transformation and redefinition,”9 which also leaves NATO at the crossroads once 
again.10 As Rühle notes, 
“[t]oday’s transatlantic security debate is, in essence, the debate that did not 
take place a little over a decade ago, when the Cold War ended. Back then, a 
fundamental discussion about the future shape of the transatlantic relationship 
seemed inevitable. But it was put off. There was simply too much unfinished 
business left over from the Cold War.”11 
Far from constituting a dispute led exclusively in the transatlantic arena, Nye 
observes that also “Americans are divided over how to be involved with the rest of 
the world,”12 especially in security politics. While the 9/11 attacks are commonly 
interpreted as a symptom for more fundamental changes in world politics arising from 
a new, post-bipolar order and attributing to a certain urgency to effectively meet new 
security challenges,13 they had a deep and lasting impact on policymaking and policy 
debate in the United States that have considered themselves at war ever since, 
leaving the United States now in a position where its foreign policymakers are free to 
consider different strategic choices.14 U.S. policymakers and foreign policy experts 
thus see themselves confronted with a most fundamental question:  
“Where do we go from here? Americans are still wrestling with how best to 
combine our power and our values while reducing our vulnerabilities.”15  
In this context, the United States displays a mixed record vis-à-vis the use of NATO 
as a collective defense organization. After the organization had invoked the mutual 
                                                 
8 Hamilton 2003; Haftendorn 2003; Krause 2003. 
9 Hamilton 2002, 154. 
10 In the 1990’s, NATO as a security institution had not been called into question by the United States. On the 
contrary, the United States sought to acquiesce European concerns about “out-of-area” missions and advocated a 
broader conception of NATO’s tasks. The U.S. debate on NATO largely focused on the issue of the first round 
of NATO enlargement. On account of the “Open Door” policy during the Clinton administration, see Asmus 
2002. A more critical view on NATO enlargement is offered by Brzezinski 1998. For a discussion of the 
strategic reorientation in the 1990’s and the new strategic concepts, see Haftendorn 2003. On the new quality of 
today’s debate, see Smith 2003, 14; Dowd 2003, online; Fugate 2002, online. On the perceived crisis of NATO, 
see Calleo 2003b, 17. See also Everts on account of this observation, 2001, 19. 
11 Rühle 2003, 90. 
12 Nye 2002, xiv. 
13 Nye 2002, x; Segbers, 2003. Peel points out that, although political observers had first concluded that “the 
world will never be the same again,” 9/11 did not change it as much as assumed. Instead, the issues and 
underlying trends that were apparent before 9/11 have simply re-emerged or gained momentum. 9/11 thus 
exacerbated already existing trends. Peel 2002, 20. 
14 Haftendorn 2003. The United States argued that the 9/11 attacks have triggered its right for self-defense, 
which would also provide a basis for preemptive action. This interpretation also impacted on NATO, since 
Europeans tend to consider terrorism as acts of crime rather than acts of war. Busse 2003; Gießmann 2003; 
Schneckener 2003, 5.  
15 Nye 2002, x. 
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defense clause enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States 
kept it sidelined in the ensuing war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Given 
this record, some scholars conclude that “the old alliance holds little promise to figure 
prominently in U.S. global strategic thinking” and is therefore “doomed.”16 At the 
same time, however, NATO seems far from being ‘finished business’ for the United 
States. In establishing the NATO-Russia-Council in May 2002 and in completing the 
second round of NATO enlargement in spring 2004, the Bush administration showed 
continued commitment towards NATO. Furthermore, statements by government 
officials emphasize the central role ascribed to NATO in the war on terrorism and the 
importance of revitalizing the transatlantic relationship.17 While NATO forces were 
finally permitted into Afghanistan and subsequently took over local stabilization 
efforts, NATO allies were also asked to contribute to post-conflict stabilization in Iraq.  
This mixed record partly mirrors the struggle between a number of different 
perspectives within the U.S. foreign policy establishment on how the United States 
should engage in the world and how old alliances fit into this picture.18  In addition to 
ranking high on the transatlantic agenda, NATO constitutes a major issue within the 
U.S. foreign policy establishment. Therefore, capturing and describing the debates on 
both sides of the Atlantic present necessary first steps to draw conclusions on the 
inner workings of what is perceived as a transatlantic ‘crisis’ in security politics. 
Within the limited scope of this paper, this analysis will exclusively focus on the U.S. 
debate on NATO, seeking to present a clear picture and to reveal major “battle 
lines”19 between different perspectives on this issue. ‘Drawing the map’ of the U.S. 
debate on security politics with regard to NATO and identifying its different strands 
will therefore be the objective of this analysis. Consequently, the research question 
guiding this paper is as follows:   
What lines of argument and policy options are advanced to decision-
makers and what are the main arguments prevailing in the U.S. debate on 
NATO? 
How can this analysis be accomplished? Abelson points to the limited possibilities to 
research the inner circles of decisionmaking when lacking access to relevant sources 
                                                 
16 Gedmin 2002, A21. 
17 See various statements by former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns. Online. Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador.html (accessed 20 December 2003). 
18 Hamilton 2002; Haftendorn 2003; Gießmann 2003; Daalder/Lindsay 2003a, 288f. 
19 Nye 2002, 154. 
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documenting actual decisionmaking processes.20 However, “this battle [on NATO] 
has been fought publicly and during think-tank debates between proxies.”21 
Accordingly, in order to reconstruct the current U.S. debate on NATO, this paper will 
focus on publications of foreign policy experts located in so-called ‘think tanks’ that 
have become an ever more visible actor in the political arena. With their statements 
being made publicly available, this approach furthermore allows for capturing the 
entire debate on NATO that is being conducted in the United States.  
Apart from satisfying a purely hermeneutic interest,22 this approach also addresses a 
major shortcoming in academic research: Think tanks, although remaining at the 
margins of government, have assumed an important role in the fields of agenda-
setting and the creation and dissemination of distinct, policy-relevant research and 
recommendations on specific issues. However, as Keohane and Nye have already 
noted, “[t]raditional analysts of international politics have paid little attention to 
agenda formation: to how issues come to receive sustained attention by high 
officials.”23 As Abelson points out, “[i]n part, this may be attributed to the growing 
tendency of political scientists to concentrate more on explaining policy outcomes 
than evaluating policy inputs.”24 This analysis, therefore, is concerned with the ‘input’ 
side of foreign policymaking by focusing on the policy options advanced by think tank 
analysts, thus seeking to shed light on an insufficiently-researched subject of foreign 
policy analysis. In arguing that domestic actors can exert influence on policymaking, 
this analysis therefore assumes an interconnectedness between foreign affairs and 
domestic politics.25 This notion leads back to the introductory statement that 
“American foreign policy (…) can only be understood with reference to its domestic 
sources.” 
In order to evaluate input and to pay tribute to the complexity of the subject, the 
debate’s content needs to be captured and described in the first place. This task will 
                                                 
20 Abelson 1996, 3. 
21 DeYoung 2001, 1. 
22 Some analysts warn that the most fashionable talk about American “hyperpower” and European “weakness” 
renders a serious attempt to find common ground in the transatlantic debate impossible, thus leading to a serious 
misjudgment of current issues. It will therefore be necessary to take a closer look at the issues and proposals 
advanced on both sides. Krause 2003; Mols 2003. 
23 Keohane/Nye 1989, 32. 
24 Abelson 1996, 19, emphasis added. 
25 The analysis therefore fits into the findings of scholars such as Robert Putnam, who champions the notion of 
‘two-level games,’ thus seeking to provide an analytical framework for analyzing the impact of domestic actors 
on foreign policymaking, Putnam 1993. On the assumption that policymakers seek advice of non-state actors 
such as think tanks see also Abelson 1996, 126. 
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be performed in the following analysis. It will carve out distinct perspectives advanced 
by think tank scholars against the backdrop of their respective analytical approach. 
The systematic description of the content in question and the identification of 
considerable overlaps between these positions that are likely to provide common 
ground for internal consensus-building is furthermore assumed to be a necessary 
prerequisite allowing for subsequent causal analysis.  
In brief, the future role of NATO in transatlantic security relations once again ranks 
high on the transatlantic agenda. Scholars on transatlantic security relations, 
however, are confronted with a fragmented, though fervently led foreign policy 
debate on NATO in the United States. In order to draw conclusions on current rifts 
over transatlantic security policy, it is necessary to describe and analyze the different 
perspectives offered in the United States on NATO in the first place. This will be 
achieved by the structured analysis of communication content. This analysis looks at 
the input side of policymaking, thus helping address an insufficiently-researched 
realm of studies on foreign policymaking.  
Chapter two provides insight into the main tasks and functions of think tanks, and 
gives a more detailed outline of the method of qualitative content analysis applied 
here, as well as a brief discussion of its strengths and shortcomings. 
Chapter three presents the empirical material by mapping four different perspectives 
on NATO. Chapter four focuses on significant differences and overlaps between 
these perspectives. Chapter five summarizes the findings and identifies major trends 
in the U.S. NATO debate. Furthermore, it discusses these findings with regard to 
theoretical implications and identifies questions for follow-up studies. 
 
 
2. Methodological Approach 
      
 
2.1 The Role of Think Tanks in U.S. Foreign Policymaking and Debate 
 
The process of U.S. foreign policymaking can be regarded as highly pluralistic and 
competitive, with a complex set of actors constituting a deeply fragmented U.S. 
governmental system. Domestic actors constantly attempt to engage in agenda-
setting, thus leading to ‘politicization’ and ‘agitation and controversy’ about certain 
  11
issues.26 Scholars of foreign policymaking have constructed a vast array of models 
and theoretical focuses to capture the “hyper pluralistic nature of American society”27 
and decisionmaking processes. The inherent constraints of bureaucracy, 
psychological pressures policymakers have to cope with, and competing interests 
between various U.S. agencies represent but a small number of theoretical 
approaches developed to describe and explain foreign policy choices.28  
These models, however, tend to overlook actors that help shape foreign policy 
options prior to the decisionmaking process. Given the openness of the U.S. political 
system for external expertise and sources of advice, U.S. foreign policymaking is not 
limited to policy-makers themselves, but is also shaped in critical ways by actors not 
formally involved in the policymaking process, such as the media, interest groups, 
and think tanks. U.S. foreign policymaking thus entails forging consensus among 
these diverse actors that influence policy outcomes in- and outside government. 
Additionally, as Keohane and Nye note, the proliferation of foreign policy-relevant 
issues policymakers have to focus on, steadily exasperate “the problems of 
formulating a coherent and consistent foreign policy (…)”29 and prompt a growing 
need for consultation and expertise. The ‘divided government’ and ‘Balkanized’ 
executive branch departments as well as a weak party discipline have furthermore 
increased the demand for ‘intellectual ammunition’ in the U.S. policymaking 
process.30 Think tanks therefore present a new political actor satisfying these needs 
and providing key input into the process of foreign policy formulation. Abelson 
concludes, 
“think tanks in the United States are in many respects unique. In no other 
country they have assumed such a visible role on the political landscape or 
been able and willing to rely on various governmental and nongovernmental 
channels to help shape the nation’s political, economic and social agenda.”31 
‘Think tank’ is an umbrella term that can be applied to different kinds of organizations. 
Until now, a wide variety of different definitions has accumulated.32 Surveys of the 
                                                 
26 Keohane/Nye 1989, 33. 
27 McGunn, quoted in Stone 1996, 40. 
28 For an extensive discussion of theoretical models of foreign policymaking such as the rational actor model, 
bureaucratic models of decisionmaking, studies of the psychology of decisionmaking, elite and interest-group 
models of decisionmaking and a discussion of their shortcomings see Abelson 1996, 103-118. 
29 Keohane/Nye 1989, 27. 
30 Braml 2004, 282. 
31 Abelson 1996, 2. 
32 For an overview of the various labels attached to think tanks as well as attempts to develop a comprehensive 
definition see Stone 1996, 9ff. 
  12
think tank landscape in the United States have also encountered difficulty in 
providing a concluding typology of think tanks. They vary considerably in size, 
financial resources, staffing, and areas of specialization. Furthermore, they differ in 
their organizational features, the constituencies they choose to serve, and their 
ideological orientation.33 According to a minimalist definition, however, a think tank 
can be defined as a non-profit and independent organization engaged in public policy 
research.34 Former Brookings President Bruce MacLaury widened the definition by 
describing think tanks as “organization[s] that appl[y] academic skills to public policy 
questions through research, publication, and educational outreach.”35 According to 
Stone, think tanks are organizationally independent from corporate or other interests 
as well as from governmental agencies by their status as non-profit organizations. 
Furthermore, they are intellectually independent, determine their own research 
agendas36 and “are typified by a desire to inform the policy process.”37  
Think tanks can be separated into two broad categories or typologies:  
1. Independent research organizations or ‘old guard’ institutes, characterized by 
heavy reliance on academic research and strong academic orientations; 
2. Advocacy or ‘new partisan’ institutes that seek to put an ‘ideological spin’ on 
their research. New partisans can be divided into conservative, 
neoconservative, liberal-progressive, and libertarian institutes, thus 
representing different positions on the political spectrum.38  
In trying to capture their function, Smith maintains that think tanks “grapple with the 
larger questions of American purpose and are thereby helping policymakers to think 
more creatively about policy options.”39 They furthermore “narrow the parameters of 
political debate (…) and they can give a realistic and pragmatic cast to debates.”40 
They do so by presenting interdisciplinary, science-based contributions to 
policymaking, and engaging in what has been termed research brokerage.41 
                                                 
33 Reinicke 1996, 29. 
34 Reinicke 1996, 28; Stone 1996, 1, 12. 
35 Quoted in Reinicke 1996, 29. 
36 This feature distinguishes think tanks from contract research organizations, which produce research for 
specific government agencies. Their research agendas are determined by the research preferences of the paying 
agency. RAND, though usually labeled a think tank, is an example of contract research organizations. Therefore, 
its publications will not be taken into account in this analysis. Reinecke 1996, 30f.; Stone 1996, 19. 
37 Stone 1996, 15. 
38 Reinicke 1996, 30f. See also Ricci 1993, 19f.; Abelson 1996, 4; Stone 1996, 5. 
39 Quoted in Reinecke 1996, 40f. 
40 Landers, quoted in Reinecke 1996, 41. 
41 Ricci 1993, 19; Stone 1996, 11. 
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Research brokerage constitutes “a process of conveying social scientific knowledge 
from universities and affiliated research organisations to the world of politics and 
decision-making.”42  
In the application of social science to public questions, policy experts derive 
rationales from abstract concepts and use them for outlining policy 
recommendations.43 They therefore mold their policy recommendations in an 
argumentative framework consistent with a specific analytical approach,44 thus also 
capturing a ‘niche’ on the competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ to compete for influence 
and constituencies.45 In so doing, they identify, articulate, and evaluate current or 
emerging issues, thus serving as an important catalyst for agenda-setting.46  
Think tanks employ a number of strategies to reach out to decision-makers. Apart 
from drawing up in-depth analyses on specific policy issues, think tank analysts may 
participate in campaigns or invite members of Congress, government officials as well 
as journalists to lunches, panel discussions, seminars, and lecture series in order to 
showcase their ideas.47 Moreover, they may appear as guests on talk shows or 
testify before Congress or special committees on a wide range of issues. In addition, 
a lot of think tank analysts cycle in and out of government, thus constantly remaining 
involved in policy formation.48 Considering their ability to provide forums for debate, 
they may also help mold areas of consensus in policy conflicts. In this respect, think 
tanks not only advance distinct policy proposals, but simultaneously act as mediators 
and platforms for consensus-building prior to the decisionmaking process.  
Notwithstanding the assumed role think tanks play in the provision of input for 
policymakers, it is hard to measure the overall degree to which think tanks exert 
                                                 
42 Stone 1996, 122. 
43 Smith 1991, 17. 
44 Many policy analysts hope to add to the corpus of scientific literature. There is, however, a tension between 
sustaining academic legitimacy and speaking to the discipline on the one hand, and the brokerage function and 
engagement with policy institutes on the other. Although the tension between “the scholar” and “the 
practitioner” is unlikely to be resolved, think tanks can act as centers for communication between both worlds. 
For examples of intersections of scholarship and policy see Stone 1996, 203ff. 
45 Braml 2004, 284; Abelson 1996, 66; Smith 1991, 190ff. 
46 Braml 2004, 51f. In general, think tanks are resources of political ideas and proposals as well as evaluators of 
policies and programs. They offer forums for debate and are arbiters of political dialogue. They provide 
expertise in a specific policy field and are sources for future reference. Reinicke 1996, 32ff. In case universities 
perform contract research for governmental agencies, a direct link between universities and policymakers is 
installed. Furthermore, academics may also be asked to serve in government. Academic scholars can also 
provide necessary advice to government officials, either as consultants or as public testifiers before Congress. 
Often, however, academic scholars are associated with a think tank, thus combining scholarly research with 
policy-oriented research. Reinecke 1996, 34. 
47 Abelson 1996, 67ff. 
48 Abelson 1996, 71; Stone 1996, 124. 
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influence on policymaking. However, since agendas and policy considerations are 
increasingly undertaken outside government and before policymakers become 
actively involved in the decisionmaking process, think tanks can influence how policy 
is debated, thus exercising a ‘structural impact’ on foreign policymaking. As Stone 
concludes, 
“there is little doubt that [think tanks] help provide the conceptual language, 
the ruling paradigms, the empirical examples that became the accepted 
assumptions for those in charge of making policy.”49 
To sum up, think tanks and their personnel have become an important actor in the 
foreign policymaking process. Although they are not part of the formal policymaking 
arena, they provide decision-makers with input and expertise on issues of political 
concern. In order to be able to compete in the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ they mold their 
arguments in a specific way, drawing on academic research and transforming it into 
policy-informing analyses for decisionmaking. In so doing, they perform two 
functions. First, by advancing distinct policy recommendations, they shape the 
political debate prior to the decisionmaking process. Second, by providing platforms 
for public discussion, they also help mold areas for consensus-building. These two 
functions will be taken into account when outlining the methodological approach and 
performing the analysis.  
 
2.2 Capturing the Debate – Methodological Approach 
 
As Abelson states, “[b]y relying on various governmental and nongovernmental 
channels, think-tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in the 
political process, have attempted to influence the content and outcome of major 
policy initiatives.”50 Accordingly, a number of different perspectives rival for 
domination in this ongoing communication process. In this analysis, their description 
will be achieved by the structured analysis of communication content.51 Rust, who 
first sought to establish the method of qualitative content analysis52 defines it as the  
                                                 
49 Stone 1996, 110. 
50 Abelson 1996, 90, emphasis added. 
51 Content can be defined as a means by which one person or group of persons communicates with another. 
52 The term “content analysis” originally referred to a quantitative technique of communication research, but has 
been extended to “qualitative” analysis since the method was criticized as being too superficial and not able to 
cover the deeper “meaning” of content by focusing exclusively on quantifiable techniques. Furthermore, 
quantitative analysis was strongly criticized for the “atomization” of content. Instead, by “qualitatively” 
reconstructing main lines of argument, the material was assumed to be able to “speak for itself.” The dispute 
between “quantitative” and “qualitative” analysis had already started in the 1950s, when Bernard Berelson and 
Sebastian Kracauer strongly advocated their respective concepts. Definitions of the term are very specific and 
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“[c]lassification, fixation of contours of the research object in its context, 
disassociation against other objects and the general characterization of its 
inner composition.”53 
Thus, qualitative content analysis “identifies and describes the linguistic 
characteristics of a text objectively and systematically in order to draw conclusions on 
non-linguistic characteristics of persons and social aggregates.”54  
Qualitative content analysis entails the description and analysis of a specific body of 
content that needs to be properly defined. It furthermore requires a systematic 
approach to work on the given body of content.55 The material in focus must be 
available in a fixed form prior to the analysis, e.g. in documents, protocols, articles 
etc. The systematic analysis of documents can be defined as  
“a research technique allowing for conclusions that can be generalized beyond 
the single analyzed document by a systematic and objective identification of 
elements of any kind of item carrying meaning.”56 
 
Furthermore, fixed documents enable the researcher to reconstruct social processes 
that exist independently from the respective research question, thus allowing for 
repeated analysis.57  
One of the central contributions of qualitative content analysis is the establishment of 
assumed inferences about the relationship between either intent and content or 
content and effect.58 This analysis assumes that communication content presented 
by think tank analysts will exert a certain effect on policymakers. However, it will 
                                                                                                                                                        
exclusive. Despite its shortcomings to fully capture the wide range of content analysis procedures, the term 
“content analysis” is also used in this study. For a critical discussion of the term see Mayring 1983, 22ff. 
53 “Klassifikation, Festlegung der Konturen eines Untersuchungsgegenstandes in seinem Kontext, Abgrenzung 
gegen andere Objekte und die allgemeine Charakterisierung seiner inneren Beschaffenheit.“ Rust 1981, 196, 
translation K.K. As Mayring points out, however, the difficulties to define qualitative content analysis as an 
analytical tool stems also from the broad range of material the analysis can focus on. The body of content does 
not have to satisfy specific features. It can incorporate private conversation – i.e. psychoanalytic interviews – as 
well as mass communication procedures such as radio communications, or conversations between specific 
groups of society. It may also focus on written as well as oral content. Mayring 1983, 10; Berelson 1952, 13ff. 
54 Mayntz/Holm/Hübner describe content analysis as follows: „[Eine Methode, die die] sprachlichen 
Eigenschaften eines Textes objektiv und systematisch identifiziert und beschreibt, um daraus Schlußfolgerungen 
auf nicht-sprachliche Eigenschaften von Personen und gesellschaftlichen Aggregaten zu ziehen.“ 1974, 151. 
55 Mayring points out that there is no comprehensive set of qualitative methods; they may vary in each study. See 
Mayring on this problem, 1983, 10, 24. 
56 „Forschungstechnik, mit der man aus jeder Art von Bedeutungsträgern durch systematische und objektive 
Identifizierung ihrer Elemente Schlüsse ziehen kann, die über das einzelne analysierte Dokument hinaus 
verallgemeinerbar sein sollen.” Kromrey 1994, 232, translation K.K. 
57 Kromrey 1994, 292.  
58 Berelson admits that there have only been very few studies that have concretely demonstrated the nature or the 
extent of the relationship between content on the one hand, and intent or effect on the other. Berelson 1952, 18; 
Mayring 1983, 10f. 
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focus on describing and analyzing the content rather than attempting to track its 
actual effects in decisionmaking. Performing qualitative analysis entails three steps:  
1. The body of content that is to be analyzed needs to be defined; 
2. The material that is to be analyzed has to be contextualized; 
3. The procedure of the qualitative content analysis is to be outlined.59 
 
2.2.1 Defining the Material 
The material looked at in this analysis is composed of a variety of written documents 
and other sources that have been published by think tank analysts: 
1. Books and articles published in academic journals;  
2. Articles published in newspapers and columns; 
3. Op-eds and short statements mostly published on the web;  
4. Interviews with or testimonies of the respective analysts . 
Today, there is a “bewildering array” of think tanks in the United States.60 Although 
this analysis seeks to present all issues discussed and options advanced on NATO in 
the United States, a sample of relevant material needs to be selected. This analysis 
will rely on the publications of ten major think tanks in the United States. 
It draws on the material of five think tanks considered as research institutes: The 
Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although research institutes consider 
themselves non-partisan, they can be associated with a more liberal (Carnegie 
Endowment, Brookings Institution) or conservative (American Enterprise Institute) 61 
agenda. Furthermore, this paper draws on publications of two conservative advocacy 
think tanks – the Heritage Foundation and the Hudson Institute – as well as two 
liberal advocacy think tanks – the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) and the Institute 
for Policy Studies (IPS). The libertarian perspective is represented by the Cato 
Institute.62 
                                                 
59 Mayring 1983, 40ff. 
60 Stone 1996, 18. 
61 Although the American Enterprise Institute is today often classified as “neoconservative,” in its beginning AEI 
took a distinctively conservative perspective. Braml 2004, 278. 
62 Libertarians usually focus on economic affairs and believe in ‘small government.’ However, in security 
politics, the Cato Institute speaks to a constituency that is considered “neo-isolationist” in orientation. This 
constituency is rather small; Cato Institute represents the only major institute outlining policy proposals for it.  
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However, since not all think tanks are ideologically conform, different perspectives on 
an issue may be advanced within the same think tank, sparking considerable 
discussion within the organization itself. Therefore, rather than ascribing a specific 
perspective to a think tank in general, this study will focus on the respective analyses 
of the individual think tank scholars.  
 
2.2.2 Contextualizing the Material - Contending Views on U.S. Foreign Policy 
Debates among foreign policy experts about a given policy issue have already been 
subject to scholarly research.63 However, as Hamilton points out, an attempt to 
classify the different perspectives on a public policy issue in the United States raises 
the problem of how to adequately label them in order to be able to categorize and 
restructure their respective lines of argument. Characterizing them as comprehensive 
and exclusive ‘schools of thought’ may risk giving the debate more coherence than it 
actually has, while at the same time neglecting considerable overlaps existent 
between the different positions.64 Instead, this analysis will resort to the term ‘camp’ 
in order to distinguish between the different perspectives. In this understanding, a 
camp is constituted by a variety of individual scholars that roughly share a common 
view on a particular public policy issue against the background of a specific 
approach. In performing their respective analyses, they positively refer to and 
reinforce each other’s findings. With regard to the objective of this analysis, “drawing 
out such distinctions may help to illuminate different ways American opinion leaders 
think about the issue,”65 while at the same time also providing room for exploring 
considerable overlaps between the different camps. How, then, can the respective 
camps be labeled? Until now, this task was solved in different ways by scholars who 
focus on contending perspectives that prompt distinct policy implications on foreign 
policy issues in the United States.66  
However, attempts to adequately label the different camps that advance policy 
options on current security politics with regard to NATO too often remain unclear and 
diffuse. While some labels refer to the kind of policy proposals the camps are likely to 
promote, others are oriented towards the approach undergirding the respective 
argument.  
                                                 
63 Hamilton 2002; Thränert 2002. 
64 Hamilton 2002. 
65 Hamilton 2002, 148. 
66 Asmus 2003; Nye 2002; Maynes 2001.  
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Nye therefore seeks to assign more political labels to the camps of foreign policy 
experts dominant in the current U.S. security debate. He starts out by observing that 
“[t]he debate today, however, is not only between the isolationists and 
internationalists, but also within the internationalist camp, which is split between 
unilateralists and multilateralists.”67 Drawing on his analysis, four different camps can 
be distinguished. 
1. The first camp that Nye classifies as ‘neo-isolationist’ in outlook is largely made up 
of scholars from the libertarian Cato Institute. By adopting a structural realist 
approach, they argue that the United States should engage in the world only 
selectively. In referring to John Quincy Adams’s famous 1821 assertion that the 
United States “goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy” they argue that the 
United States should disengage from the world, especially in security politics.68  
2. The second camp is made up of neoconservatives who advance a ‘new 
unilateralism’ combined with a “Reaganite variant of Wilsonianism”69 that recognizes 
the uniqueness of the unipolar world. In contrast to libertarians, they advocate the 
strong promotion of U.S. values and interests abroad.  
3. According to Nye, even before 9/11, this prescription was challenged by both 
liberals and conservatives. Conservatives, who consider themselves realists, closely 
focus on the pursuit of the national interest in a balance-of-power system as the most 
stable configuration of the international landscape.  
4. Liberals, on the contrary, pursue a neo-liberal institutionalist approach on the 
conduct of foreign security policy; they stress the promotion of democracy and 
human rights within the context of international institutions.70  
This differentiation into four political camps seems apt to capture the current think 
tank debate in the United States, since think tanks are at the nexus of academics and 
practical policymaking and therefore design and advance policy proposals for a 
specific political constituency in Congress or government. Furthermore, these labels 
roughly correspond to the political orientation of think tanks.71  
                                                 
67 Nye 2002, xiv. 
68 For a discussion of this group see Nye 2002, 148f. 
69 Nye 2002, 147. Ikenberry, by referring to Hassner’s phrase, labels neoconservatives as “Wilsonian in boots,” 
2004, 10. On the “new unilateralism” see Krauthammer 2001, A29. 
70 Nye 2002, 148ff. On account of different foreign policy traditions that are mirrored in today’s political 
landscape see Schweigler 2003. 
71 See section 2.1 
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With regard to the time frame, this analysis will take into account think tank 
publications from September 2001 until March 2004.72 It does not look at the material 
chronologically, since think tank analysts did not substantially alter their lines of 
arguments due to certain events, but rather referred to them within their respective 
argumentation. The current debate on NATO is far from being finished. This analysis 
can therefore only capture a part of the current debate that is to be continued well 
into the future.  
 
2.2.3 Procedure of the Analysis 
The analysis will proceed in two steps. First, the material will be captured and 
described. Therefore, guiding questions that naturally flow from the research question 
are established in order to lead through the analysis.73 For each camp (libertarian, 
neoconservative, conservative, liberal), the following guiding questions will be looked 
at:  
  1. How are the analysts’ arguments molded (approach)?  
2. What is the main line of argument concerning NATO (agenda)? How is              
         NATO’s role being assessed in this context?      
   3. Which strategies are being proposed?  
Second, drawing on the findings of the material’s description, the main differences 
and overlaps between the camps will be extracted in order to carve out the main 
topics prevailing in the U.S. NATO debate and to point to trends that may determine it 
well into the future. In the following, a brief background is provided and the first step 
of the analysis is performed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 The NATO Summit in March 2004, which completed the second round of NATO enlargement, will mark the 
end of this analysis.  
73 As Mayring points out, the lack of a well-established set of specific methods presents one of the main 
disadvantages of qualitative analysis. Guiding questions, however, allow for capturing the content with regard to 
the respective research question; Mayring 1983. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
 
 
3.1 Background 
 
In this section, a brief overview of the main events that have occurred since 9/11 in 
the context of NATO will be sketched out.74 Two major trends can be observed that 
will be focused on in the following: First, U.S. ignorance vis-à-vis NATO’s attempts to 
act as a military alliance in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing break-
down of its relevance in military terms. Second, the ongoing U.S. commitment to 
bring about NATO reform as well as the second round of NATO enlargement.  
As John Hulsman, scholar at the Heritage Foundation, maintains, “[o]ne of the most 
underreported stories in the wake of the 9/11 attacks was the non-use of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.”75 In the aftermath of 9/11, for the first time since NATO 
came into being, Article 576 of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked, declaring an 
attack on one member of the alliance an attack against all. However, following this 
commitment, NATO was deliberately bypassed by the United States: “[The] image of 
the three Musketeers was quickly belied by the American response (…): Thanks, but 
no thanks. Washington saw the alliance as simply not worth the bother.”77 Apart from 
the rather symbolic deployment of NATO AWACS surveillance planes for the United 
States to assist in the air cover, NATO as a military alliance was not assigned any 
role by the United States in response to the 9/11 attacks. After having rejected 
NATO’s offers to participate in the mission in Afghanistan, the United States instead 
assembled a ‘coalition of the willing,’ including, but not limited to, a number of NATO 
allies.78  
                                                 
74 An extensive discussion is provided by Lansford 2003. 
75 Hulsman 2002, online. 
76 “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked (…).” North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5. Online. 
Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed June 20, 2004). 
77 Hulsman 2002, online. Article 5 was invoked due to an initiative of NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, 
not in response to a U.S. request.  Haftendorn 2003, 254. 
78 Cooper 2003, 190. Great Britain proved to be the only NATO member that had troops and equipment at its 
disposal that were deployable abroad. Major coalition partners outside of the formal NATO structure were 
Russia and Central Asian countries as well as Pakistan. An overview is provided by Haftendorn 2003. 
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The formal adoption of the policy of preemption outlined in the National Security 
Strategy of the United States79 in September 2002 added to a growing sense that the 
Bush administration would continue to reject traditional alliances and instead adopt a 
unilateralist approach, thus becoming “less bound to its partners and to global rules 
and institutions while [stepping] forward to play a more unilateral and anticipatory role 
in attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue states seeking weapons of mass 
destruction.”80 In addition, fears raised that U.S. action would become increasingly 
unpredictable; in the State of the Union Address in January 2002, President Bush 
referred to Iran, Iraq, and North-Korea as ‘axis of evil’ and accused them of harboring 
terrorists and seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction.81  
Moreover, the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., triggered the Bush 
administration’s ‘war on terrorism’ and the call for ‘regime change’ in Iraq with the 
removal of Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein, who was accused of developing weapons 
of mass destruction and supporting terrorists, especially the international terror 
network Al-Qaeda.82 Although individual NATO allies were asked to consider a range 
of contributions, including non-combat activities, NATO as an alliance was initially 
neither expected to play a direct role in Iraq nor was it comprehensively consulted on 
this issue.83 Furthermore, while UN Security Council Resolution 1441 provided a 
basis on which Iraq was called upon to disarm, consensus among NATO member 
states fell apart over how the resolution should be backed up. The ensuing rupture 
over the legitimization of a military intervention in Iraq in the United Nations Security 
Council in February and March 2003 additionally “placed the United States squarely 
at odds with some of its closest NATO allies,” thus exacerbating transatlantic 
tensions and leading to an unprecedented split in the transatlantic alliance.84 In this 
context, France, Germany, and Belgium blocked the U.S. request to transfer military 
equipment to Turkey in the event of an Iraq war by arguing that this would be viewed 
                                                 
79 National Security Strategy of the United States (2002): Online. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (accessed 20 February 2004). 
80 Ikenberry, quoted in Cooper 2003, 191. 
81 State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002. Online. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01 (accessed June 1, 2004). Furthermore, Bush posited a stark 
choice in saying “Either you are with us, (…) or you are with the terrorists.” Quoted in De Young 2001, A01. 
For an account of the stark rhetoric employed after 9/11 by President Bush, see Daalder 2003; Rudolf 2002.  
82 Cooper 2003, 179. 
83 However, as Loeb and Ricks point out, there has been considerable disagreement over this issue within the 
administration. While Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld answered a question about what role NATO might 
possibly have in Iraq by saying that the administration had not even proposed it, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz had outlined steps NATO could take in Iraq as early as December 2002. Loeb/Ricks 2002, A35. 
84 Cooper 2003, 179. 
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as inappropriate NATO endorsement of an ill-advised military action. This “rare 
display of defiance of U.S military leadership” has additionally pushed the alliance 
“into one of its deepest crises ever.”85  
As the rhetoric about the Iraq policy became more heated, however, a deep split 
emerged within Europe itself. According to a statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, the countries eventually falling in line with the United States were 
referred to as ‘new Europe,’ as opposed to ‘old Europe.’ The latter term in particular 
referred to France and Germany, both of which continued to reject the prospect of 
regime change in Iraq, with France being ready to use its veto power in the UN 
Security Council to oppose, and eventually block, a resolution aimed at authorizing a 
military strike on Iraq.86 In brief, this situation has led some foreign policy and security 
experts to ask whether the long-standing alliance can weather the rapidly changing 
security environment. As Kissinger concludes, NATO’s bypassing as a military 
alliance as well as the differences over Iraq have “produced the gravest crisis in the 
Atlantic Alliance since its creation five decades ago.”87 
While having kept NATO sidelined from any relevant military action, the United 
States, however, has simultaneously continued to substantially contribute to NATO 
reform, arguing that NATO should be able to engage in post-conflict reconstruction 
and stabilization efforts.88 In this context, NATO was eventually given a role in 
Afghanistan as a stabilization and peacekeeping force. As early as December 2001, 
British and Turkish troops were the first to take over command of the peacekeeping 
force in Kabul.89 Furthermore, as former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns 
pointed out, “[w]e’re deconstructing the old NATO to build a new one to meet the 
threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.”90 At the NATO Summit in 
Prague in November 2002, President Bush made clear that NATO then still 
constituted an important tool for the United States; however, it needed to be 
transformed. “A strong and vibrant NATO is in the best interests of America, so we’ll 
                                                 
85 Cooper 2003, ibidem. See also Ignatius 2003, A31 on account of this issue. 
86 Cooper 2003, 194. 
87 Kissinger 2003, A21. 
88 See various statements by former U.S. Ambassador to NATO  Nicholas Burns. Online. Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador.html (accessed 20 December 2003). 
89 This NATO mission was the first one entirely conducted out of Europe, thus finally terminating the “out-of-
area” debate that had dominated the 1990’s. Cooper 2003, 192; Graham/Kaiser 2002, A14. 
90 Burns, quoted in Dowd 2003, online. 
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be active and good partners,” he vowed and added pointedly, “we expect the same 
from our NATO friends.”91  
Responding to concerns about military capabilities, alliance members adopted the 
‘Prague Capabilities Commitment’ at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 
2002. Allies committed to modernize alliance forces and improve key capabilities for 
modern military operations.92 This commitment succeeded and streamlined the 
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), set up in 1999.93 The ‘new NATO’ was expected 
to build up new command procedures and capabilities. This view was also reinforced 
by then NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson. In this context, NATO leaders 
agreed to the U.S. proposal to forge a 21,000-man NATO Response Force (NRF), to 
which member states are expected to voluntarily contribute specialty units, thereby 
accentuating their strengths. Furthermore, an agreement on a Partnership Action 
Plan against terrorism was reached at the Prague Summit, in which NATO was 
defined as a focal instrument for any multilateralist response to international 
terrorism.94 This statement was given credibility with the agreement to provide 
Germany and the Netherlands with NATO planning and support as they assumed 
command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  
The second round of NATO expansion, including the Baltic states, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria, was another major project accomplished in 2002. 
At the Prague Summit, seven new members to NATO were formally admitted and 
scheduled to join NATO in 2004. The second round of enlargement was eventually 
completed in March 2004, thus expanding the alliance to a membership of 26. Thus, 
a ‘double’ enlargement of membership and mandate took place at the 
‘Transformation Summit’ in Prague.  
In brief, the U.S. record on NATO since 9/11 is mixed.95 While NATO was given no 
credibility as a military alliance in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States 
simultaneously became the main driving force of NATO’s ‘double enlargement’ at the 
                                                 
91 Bush, quoted in Dowd 2003, ibidem. 
92 This commitment was designed to eventually quadruple the number of outsize aircraft in Europe, to establish 
air-to-air refueling aircraft, to ensure that most of NATO’s high-readiness forces will be equipped with chemical, 
radiological, biological, and nuclear defense capabilities, and to increase European precision-guided munitions. 
Cooper 2003, 192; Rühle 2003, 95. 
93 The DCI identified more than 400 areas in which capability improvement was deemed necessary. However, 
this transformation aim was not considered realistic. 
94 Rühle 2003, 93. 
95 The policies of the Bush administration vis-à-vis NATO are commented on in very different terms: While 
some observe the emergence of a new “grand strategy,” others complain about the continued lack of a clear 
strategy, especially with regard to the Iraq intervention. Ignatius 2002, A31. 
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Prague Summit. Consequently, two issues crystallized in the current U.S. debate on 
NATO. First, NATO’s ability to share the security burden with the United States is 
critically discussed. Second, potential benefits and perils arising from NATO 
enlargement are assessed. These two issues will provide focal points for the 
reconstruction of the camps’ lines of argument. In the following, the first step of the 
analysis is performed. The analysis will start out with the camp most critical of 
continued U.S. commitment in NATO.  
 
3.2 The Case for Decoupling from a NATO Worse than Useless96 
 
A rather critical strand of scholars mostly affiliated with the Cato Institute97 maintains 
that “NATO is irrelevant without an enemy.”98 In this view, NATO has irrevocably lost 
its raison d’être with the end of the Cold War and is not suited to address the security 
challenges of the 21st century. Against the odds, however, NATO is not disappearing, 
as realist scholars had predicted after the end of the Cold War. It has thus become 
an expensive and dangerous anachronism in the post-Cold War era; therefore, the 
United States should withdraw from a perilous security engagement with Europe. 
Libertarian scholars adopt a structural realist approach. In connecting the burden-
sharing issue with NATO enlargement, they point to the perils arising from an 
extended U.S. security guarantee to strategically irrelevant regions. In this view, the 
United States will inevitably encounter rising powers that are irritated by the U.S. 
extended defense parameter and will therefore seek to counterbalance it. 
Furthermore, European ‘freeriding’ due to its military weakness will accelerate the 
process of U.S. decline. In the following, the approach, the line of argument, as well 
as the policy recommendations advanced by this camp are sketched out. 
 
3.2.1 Approach 
Scholars affiliated with Cato Institute maintain that the structural realist school’s 
concepts of structural anarchy, self-help, and security competition are still applicable 
and extremely useful when thinking about implications for foreign policy.99 Layne 
                                                 
96 Tupy 2003, online. 
97 In the following, the analysis relies on a number of seminal texts and analyses of scholars affiliated with Cato 
Institute like Christopher Layne, Ivan Eland, Ted Galen Carpenter, and Doug Bandow.  
98 Bandow 2002, online. 
99 Dunne and Schmidt point out that realism does not constitute a single coherent theory. Instead, there is “a 
variety of realisms” proposing contending views on the nature of conflict in international affairs and ways to 
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argues “[t]he simple answer is that international politics remains fundamentally what it 
has always been: A competitive arena in which states struggle to survive.”100 
Structural realism rests on a number of distict assumptions. International politics is 
determined by a struggle for power101 in a system characterized by structural 
anarchy. States constitute the dominant actors in world politics and are seen as 
coherent units with sovereignty102 as their distinguishing trait. Survival constitutes 
their primary objective. In a perilous international environment, states therefore 
compete with other states for security and influence. This competition is often seen in 
‘zero-sum’ terms: One actor’s gain means the other actor’s loss. While other 
instruments may also be employed, force is seen as the most effective one to protect 
vital security interests. Accordingly, security politics constitute the realm of ‘high 
politics’ as opposed to the ‘low politics’ of other means not directed towards ultimate 
survival.  
If one state becomes more powerful than others, it will inevitably be perceived as a 
threat to survival; accordingly, weaker states will seek to reduce this threat and 
strengthen their position vis-à-vis the stronger state. Two strategies are likely to be 
employed in so doing. First, if one power becomes dominant, other states will seek to 
‘counterbalance’ it and band together in order to offset it.103 Second, ‘bandwagoning’ 
with the powerful state is more likely to be employed as a strategy in case the 
dominant power has acquired too much strength or is viewed as a ‘benign hegemon.’ 
Despite benign intent, however, a dominant power will naturally continue to behave in 
ways that are frightening to others, until its power is again brought into balance.104 
Security can thus only be ensured by self-help and the constant accumulation of 
power.105 No other state can reliably guarantee for survival in the long-term.  
In a system with balance-of-power governing international relations and security 
dilemmas representing the defining moments for policy generation, political 
                                                                                                                                                        
cope with it. In the course of this analysis, different versions of realism are also revealed to be at the heart of the 
respective groups’ argumentation. Dunne/Schmidt 2001, 147f. 
100 Layne 2003, 26. 
101 Different strands of realists conceptualize power in different ways. Drawing on Kenneth Waltz’ analysis, 
structural realists closely focus on capabilities as power resources. For a more extensive discussion of different 
concepts of power in realism see Dunne/Schmidt 2001, 150. 
102 Sovereignty can be defined as the supreme authority to conduct and create policies and laws. Dunne/Schmidt 
2001, 150. 
103 Waltz 2002, 30; Eland 2002B, PDF, 22. 
104 For an extensive discussion of the “origins of alliances” see Walt 1987. 
105 Waltz 2002, 33. Providing for one’s own security, however, will entail diminishing other’s security. The 
ensuing spiral of insecurity is described as a “security dilemma.” Dunne/Schmidt 2001, 153. 
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integration remains slight and lasts only as long as it serves the vital interests of 
states.106 In this view, 
“(…) alliances have always been contextual and contingent. Pageantry and 
proclamations accompany their creation, and permanent interests and eternal 
principles are invoked hopefully, but change over time eventually corrodes 
such institutions, which ultimately are rooted in particular historical 
circumstances.”107 
According to structural realism, longstanding international alliances and regimes can 
only be maintained by a hegemonic power – a state that is powerful enough to create 
and safeguard a specific international regime or organization and is also willing to do 
so.108 This also implies military preponderance of the hegemonic power. According to 
realist theory, however, a hegemonic system will inevitably lead to its own decline, 
since unipolarity represents the least durable international configuration.  
Put more dramatically, Eland maintains that a ‘strategy of empire’ will inevitably 
encounter two major limitations. First, other powers will start to balance against the 
hegemonic power. No matter how moderate the hegemon behaves, weaker states 
will continuously worry about its future behavior.109 Since states cannot be sure that a 
hegemonic power will not become intrusive and domineering at some point in the 
future, they attempt to accumulate as much power as possible to eventually get into a 
position to be able to challenge it. Thus, the strategy of empire allows other states to 
‘freeride’ on the expense of the hegemon; bandwagoning will therefore eventually 
turn into counterbalancing.110  
Second, the dominant power will in any case exhaust itself with attempts to sustain 
its primacy. It will take steps to ward off potential challengers and persuade security 
dependents that they are still protected. Thus, 
“[a] hegemon tends to overpay for security, which eventually weakens the 
internal foundation of its external position. Other states underpay for security, 
which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive 
investments. (…) As a consequence, differential growth rates trigger shifts in 
relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great 
powers.”111  
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The chief danger for a hegemon therefore lies in the eventual strategic overextension 
that might occur in the pursuit of a military protectorship that is de facto open-ended. 
“The process of strategic overextension becomes self-reinforcing because, each time 
a hegemon expands its perimeter, new potential threats are encountered that 
demand further expansion.”112 In the realist tradition, the hegemonic equilibrium will 
inevitably erode over time, and crumble back into a balance-of-power system. For 
libertarians, hegemony therefore constitutes a perilous strategy prone to falter due to 
the logic of the international system.113 
 
3.2.2 Line of Argument 
In applying realist theory, Eland maintains that the system of international politics has 
not been transformed after the end of the Cold War; the emergence of the United 
States as the only superpower merely represents a change in the system, not a 
change of the system.114 Accordingly, Layne argues that current transatlantic 
dissonances are deeply rooted in power imbalances in the international system due 
to the military preponderance of the United States.115 In this view, the current 
transatlantic rifts over NATO date back to its founding in 1949. The creation of NATO 
was guided by the objective “to keep America in – and on top – so that Germans 
could be kept down, Europe could be kept quiet militarily, and the Europeans would 
lack any pressing incentive to unite politically.”116 The United States aimed at creating 
a de-nationalized and economically, but not politically, integrated Europe. In order to 
achieve that end, it pooled and subordinated European military capabilities to U.S. 
command. While often being seen as an instrument to contain the Soviet Union, 
NATO in this view primarily constitutes a vehicle for establishing U.S. hegemony in 
Europe.117 
According to Layne, the prospect of hegemony did not falter after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, but was rather continued in the Bush senior and Clinton 
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administrations.118 The continued reaffirmation of NATO’s importance by U.S. 
policymakers reveals U.S. post war interests in Europe that are still valid today. 
NATO thus continues to be a means for maintaining and lengthening the United 
States’ grip on the foreign and military policies of Europe. 
“In other words, NATO is still in business to advance long-standing American 
objectives that existed independently of the Cold War and hence survived the 
Soviet Union’s collapse.”119 
In drawing on the findings of structural realist theory, Cato analysts maintain that 
continuing to pursue such hegemonic strategy will be perilous for the United States 
since balance of power constitutes the inevitable logic of international affairs. In 
discussing the perils flowing from the United States’ continued commitment to the 
alliance, the issues of NATO enlargement and the problem of European freeriding 
are addressed.  
NATO’s double enlargement120  is viewed as particularly perilous to U.S. security due 
to a number of reasons. First, NATO was founded primarily as an alliance to defend 
the territorial integrity of its members by providing a mutual defense guarantee. 
However, with its first missions taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO departed 
starkly from its original purpose and performed a dramatic transformation of its 
rationale, without, however, substantially reviewing the obligations originally outlined 
in the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite continuing attempts towards a functional 
redefinition, NATO thus remains a military alliance; expanding it in geographical 
terms therefore also 
“(…) extend[s] U.S. security guarantees to peripheral regions without 
augmenting Western military power. And there should be no doubt that it 
would be Washington that would be expected to resolve any new security 
problem. The membership might be in NATO, but the security guarantee is 
American.”121  
                                                 
118 After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Bush senior administration did not consider leaving Europe or scale 
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In brief, NATO is still about giving security guarantees; ”the United States is obligated 
to defend every member – no matter how small, how militarily and economically 
insignificant, or how strategically exposed that member might be.”122 In this context, 
Carpenter points to the significant security threats triggered by NATO expansion for 
the United States. Carpenter is especially concerned about a resurgent Russia that 
might rise against the United States to challenge it. While admitting that today’s 
Russia is in no condition to seriously pose a threat to the United States and 
acknowledging Russia’s President Putin having adopted a pro-Western attitude by 
supporting the establishment of the NATO-Russia-Council, it cannot be assumed that 
Russia will remain militarily weak and politically compliant forever. While the danger 
of a breach between Russia and NATO allies may have receded at the moment, 
Russia may seek to restore its ‘sphere of influence’ in case of a serious political 
crisis.123 
“Indeed, a crisis could be triggered if a future Russian president concludes that 
a Western military presence in the Baltic region is an intolerable intrusion into 
what should rightfully be Moscow’s sphere of influence.”124 
This logic is also true for other great powers that might feel threatened by continued 
NATO enlargement. Yet, NATO obligations go on indefinitely. In Carpenter’s view, 
permanent security obligations are thus a ‘perilous pledge’ and may turn into 
disastrous liabilities in a changing and unstable security environment. 
“When permanent commitments are made to strategically and economically 
irrelevant clients, the folly is compounded. The security pledges to Lithuania 
and the other Baltic republics are a case in point. If the U.S. commitment is 
ever challenged, Washington would face a choice between a bad outcome and 
a worse one.”125 
Such commitments could even force the United States into encountering a nuclear-
armed regional power militarily. Any future challenge from Russia or other powers 
that feel threatened by the United States’ expansionist outreach through NATO might 
therefore prove to become a serious dilemma for the United States. As Carpenter 
concludes, “[t]hat degree of risk should never be incurred except in the defense of 
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America’s most vital security interests.”126 It therefore ought to be a firm interest of 
the United States not to extend security guarantees that may prove too perilous to 
guard. In supporting NATO enlargement, however, policymakers have been violating 
this ‘cardinal rule’ of foreign policymaking.  
By creating “a weird hybrid entity – part traditional alliance and part collective security 
organization,” the United States will in this view most likely end up with  
“a NATO that periodically becomes entangled in messy, Bosnia-style 
peacekeeping missions and Kosovo-style military interventions involving 
disputes that have little, if any, relevance to vital American interests and a 
NATO that is obligated to protect the alliance’s new members in Central and 
Eastern Europe if a threat by one of their neighbors – including their great-
power neighbor, Russia – ever emerges.”127 
Second, extending security guarantees to strategically irrelevant allies and getting 
entangled in humanitarian interventions will also contribute to the strategic 
overextension of the United States causing the eventual ‘imperial overstretch’ that will 
lead to the demise of the hegemonic structure. As Eland points out, “[e]mpires get 
into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the 
hinterland, garrisoning myriad outposts, and accumulating manifold security and 
treaty commitments they are obliged to honor.”128 
Third, in supporting NATO enlargement, Washington is involved in a strategy of 
‘divide and rule.’ Layne argues that the United States strongly advanced the case of 
a second round of NATO enlargement in an attempt to find new allies in ‘new Europe’ 
that will side with the United States against ‘old Europe.’  
“In short, U.S. policy seeks to encourage an intra-European counterweight that 
will block French and German aspirations to create a united counterweight to 
American hegemony.”129 
Thus, in line with its persistent hegemonic strategy, the United States seeks to 
‘subordinate’ Europe through NATO. With the absence of a common threat that 
renders European interests consistent with U.S. interests, however, this behavior will 
inevitably lead to European counterbalancing efforts. 
 In this context, Eland and Bandow furthermore point to the problem of freeriding that 
the United States is confronted with in the context of burden-sharing. Freeriding 
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powers seek to pass on the costs of their own security to the dominant power. As 
Bandow maintains, the growing military gap between the United States and Europe is 
a result of a painstaking ‘underinvestment’ of European states in military affairs 
relative to a continued growth in the U.S. defense budget since the 9/11 attacks and 
constitutes an indicator for European freeriding. Up to now, Tupy argues, the U.S. 
security guarantee is only exploited to preserve European “inefficient welfare 
states”130 and is – for the moment – not directed at seriously challenging the United 
States in military terms. It nonetheless induces an “unhealthy attitude of 
dependence”131 on the European allies. A growing “impotent frustration”132 regarding 
their dependence on the United States has become ever more evident in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. This frustration may result in a poisoned transatlantic 
relationship that will over time lead to more serious counterbalancing efforts. In this 
context, Eland maintains that balancing can also be very nuanced. A full-fledged 
military response as an attempt of ‘offense-balancing’ represents only the last resort 
and the final step in a long line of balancing measures. By contrast, ‘defense-
balancing’ or ‘soft-balancing’ is a hedging activity, aimed at keeping options open.133 
Layne maintains that “soft-balancing against the United States has already started by 
voicing open opposition in the run-up to the Iraq war. Furthermore, freeriding per se 
constitutes an effort to counterbalance the dominant state.”134 Thus, the United 
States is confronted with a European ‘security black hole’ that consumes U.S. 
defense resources while providing few assets in return.  
Cato analysts argue that in response to the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration has 
embarked on a dangerous path in abandoning its first impulse to conduct a ‘humble’ 
and more isolationist foreign policy. Instead, the administration has expanded an 
already extended defense perimeter by enlarging NATO that “will actually reduce the 
security of all Americans rather than enhance it.”135 Simultaneously – and in contrast 
to previous administrations - it has sidelined NATO in important military questions, 
thus further contributing to European resentments.  
 
                                                 
130 Tupy 2003, online. 
131 Carpenter 2002, online. 
132 Carpenter 2003, online. 
133 Eland 2002B, PDF, 18. 
134 In this context, Eland also seeks to define Russia’s eagerness to create a NATO-Russia-Council as a “shrewd 
strategy” of buck passing. Eland 2002B, PDF, 11. 
135 Eland 2002A, online. On this argument see also Layne 2001, PDF, 1. 
  32
3.2.3 Strategy: U.S. Withdrawal from NATO 
Libertarians argue that NATO represents a Cold War relic not useful to meet current 
security challenges. The only objective it serves is the maintenance of U.S. 
hegemony in Europe. With NATO continuing to exist, however, the United States will 
be exposed to incalculable strategic risks.  
First, policymakers should therefore abandon any attempt to reinvigorate NATO. 
Instead, the United States should phase out its security commitments on the Balkans. 
Moreover, Congress should refuse to appropriate funds for any ‘out-of-area’ military 
missions of NATO. Any further expansion of NATO should be opposed. Instead of 
admitting new members into NATO that would enhance perilous security pledges on 
the part of the United States, membership in the World Trade Organization, freer 
trade with America, and accession to the European Union would better serve the aim 
of integrating Eastern European countries without exposing the United States to 
avoidable risks.136 
Second, the United States should end the era of hegemony in Europe. U.S. forces 
should be entirely withdrawn from Europe. In order to meet the problem of freeriding, 
European states should take over responsibilities for their own region with the EU 
creating a setting in which the United States is no longer needed as a guarantor of 
stability. The United States should support the development of an independent 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and establish a limited security 
relationship with Europe as a hedge against developments within the EU that might 
have an adverse impact on U.S. interests in the long run. A purely European NATO 
may furthermore provide Europe with the incentive to end the “strategic 
infantilization”137 created by the long-term European security dependence on the 
United States. A U.S. withdrawal from the European ‘security subsidy’ would also 
galvanize serious economic reform. Instead of remaining defenseless, the European 
states would be urged to raise more revenue by cutting the size of the welfare state 
and increasing their economic growth. A vibrant Europe with a strong economy and a 
credible military force would also prevent Europe from engaging in any balancing 
efforts against the United States.138 More importantly, with the Europeans having the 
main security responsibility in Europe, U.S. risk exposure would be appropriately 
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limited. According to Layne, the United States should therefore start to act as an 
offshore-balancer. If managed well, a new European pole could pay off in providing 
the United States with well-equipped allies.139 In brief, an “amicable strategic 
divorce”140 will serve the interests of both Europe and the United States. 
 
3.2.4 Summing Up 
Libertarian scholars argue that NATO is an outdated and useless alliance. It does not 
serve any purpose but to maintain and extend U.S. hegemony in Europe. By 
expanding NATO and simultaneously sidelining it in military issues, the current U.S 
administration has embarked on a dangerous path. Expanding NATO will commit the 
United States to extending security guarantees to strategically peripheral regions of 
the world, thus increasing the risk that other powers may feel threatened and 
subsequently engage in counterbalancing efforts. Moreover, by fencing off European 
NATO allies in military affairs, the United States provokes counterbalancing behavior 
and suffers from continued European freeriding. The unsolved question of NATO’s 
competence in peacekeeping and humanitarian mission efforts will further exacerbate 
existing trends. Staying in NATO therefore constitutes a foreign policy folly that needs 
to be corrected. The United States should ultimately withdraw from NATO and 
establish a limited security partnership with Europe. In relying on economic and 
international financial organizations, Eastern European integration will also provide 
more benefits to each side.  
 
3.3 The Case for Transforming NATO into a Political Club 
 
A group of analysts that is commonly referred to as ‘neoconservative’ has recently 
become the subject of much comment. Today’s141 neoconservative thinkers such as 
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Robert Kagan, Max Boot, and Tom Donnelly are spread over a range of think tanks 
such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise 
Institute, and the Council on Foreign Relations. Neoconservatives believe in the 
uniqueness of a unipolar era and combine the assumption of a prolonged hegemony 
of the United States with the quest for a ‘morally sound’ foreign policy. They maintain 
that NATO has become irrelevant as a military alliance since the United States 
constitutes the seminal provider of security and stability for security dependents. 
Furthermore, in realization of the ‘Perpetual Peace,’ Europe is in no state to 
effectively address, let alone encounter, current security challenges. However, with 
regard to NATO enlargement, neoconservatives argue that NATO may remain 
necessary in providing the United States with allies legitimizing U.S. action, thus 
enabling them to pursue ‘moral ends’ in foreign policy. Furthermore, it remains a 
vehicle to reach out to strategically relevant regions. Therefore, NATO is to be 
transformed into a ‘political club’ exclusively designed to serve these purposes. In the 
following, the approach, the line of argument, as well as the policy recommendations 
advanced by this camp are sketched out. 
 
3.3.1 Approach 
Neoconservatives strongly believe in using U.S. military power to promote U.S. ideals 
abroad. In this view, it is both desirable and possible to extend the “unipolar 
moment”142 that occurred after the end of the Cold War, into a unipolar era. Their 
approach to foreign policymaking rests on three key assumptions that are not in line 
with a single approach to International Relations but rather mingle a variety of IR 
related approaches. 
First, following a structural realist approach, neoconservatives believe that states 
constitute the primary actors of international relations and pursue survival as their 
foremost goal. However, in contrast to structural realists, they are convinced that 
unipolarity143 represents a stable, peaceful and durable structure of international 
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relations and can therefore be maintained well into the future. Scholars like William 
Wohlforth argue that the clearer and larger the concentration of power of a 
hegemonic state, the more peaceful the order associated with it will be. Taking 
realism as a starting point, he suggests the existence of ‘thresholds,’ beyond which 
the unipolar structure of the international system remains unquestioned.144  
“Overall, then, unipolarity generates comparatively few incentives for security 
or prestige competition among the great powers. (…) Unipolarity does not 
imply the end of all conflict or that Washington can have its way on all issues 
all the time. It simply means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled 
the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics 
among the major powers.”145  
According to Wohlforth, balancing behavior will presumably occur among second-tier 
states, without, however, threatening the background unipolar structure. Thus, under 
conditions of unipolarity, the United States is simply too powerful to be balanced. 
Since counterbalancing alliances among states are costly and states are tempted to 
pass the buck or bandwagon with the hegemon, “the robustness of unipolarity”146 is 
further underscored. While rhetoric may continue to be resentful of U.S. 
predominance, counterbalancing will ultimately fail in a unipolar system; today, much 
of the presumed international balancing behavior is therefore presumed to be mere 
“posturing.”147  
Second, the realm of power remains the determining factor in international relations. 
In order to maintain primacy, military power and the willingness to exercise it must 
stand at the heart of U.S. foreign policy, thus demonstrating that security dependents 
will be protected and enemies punished. In this view, enemies must fear the United 
States, otherwise they will be emboldened to challenge it.  
Third, U.S. primacy should serve the pursuit of a clear moral purpose; exercising and 
preserving ‘benevolent’ global hegemony well into the future should constitute the 
primary goal of U.S. foreign policymaking. In championing this argument, 
neoconservatives starkly depart from any realist assumption and rather take a 
normative view on International Relations. Exercising power to remake the world in 
the U.S. image, however, is not assumed to represent mere idealism, but also good 
national security policy: “If democracy and the rule of law are established in troubled 
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countries around the world, they cease being threats.”148 Therefore, as early as 1996, 
Kagan and Kristol advocated a “neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy 
and moral confidence.”149 They claim that in adhering to moral standards of foreign 
policymaking, the United States should not blindly do business with any ‘rogue’ 
regime. In this view, ‘regime change’ constitutes an adequate means to promote U.S. 
foreign policy goals.150 As Kagan and Kristol stress, 
“[t]he United States achieved its present position of strength not by practicing 
a foreign policy of live and let live, (…) but by actively promoting American 
principles of governance abroad – democracy, free markets, respect for 
liberty.”151  
 
In this view, the promotion of democracy cannot be left to the long-term forces of 
economic development, but constitutes a proclaimed foreign policy goal that should 
be pursued by the use of force, if necessary, and the willingness to undertake 
expensive missions. Thus, living in a Hobbesian world of ceaseless conflict,152 the 
United States should make use of its military power to enforce peace and freedom, 
thus acting as an order-creating force. Due to this task, the United States must refuse 
to play by the same rules as other states; this is the price to be paid by the 
international community for the unipolar provision of security as envisaged by the 
United States. Multilateral institutions are therefore far from being essential or 
conducive to U.S. interests. On the contrary, “[t]he chaos in the world is too 
threatening to ignore, and existing methods for dealing with that chaos have been 
tried and found wanting.”153 Concordantly, neoconservatives are frustrated with the 
entangling rules and institutions and resent submerging U.S. power to collective 
decisionmaking. They argue that formal institutions and organizations do not work 
when it comes to dealing with rogue regimes that are believed to be at the nexus of 
international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Rather, 
they constrain U.S. action in effectively encountering these threats. Instead, “U.S. 
imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past 
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century.”154 Therefore, there is “no need to run away from label.” Instead, the United 
States “should definitely embrace the practise” of neoimperialism.155 
 
3.3.2 Line of Argument 
Against this background, Robert Kagan argues that Europe and the United States 
are separated by fundamentally different worldviews that are also mirrored in the 
burden-sharing debate with regard to NATO. “It is time to stop pretending that 
Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they 
occupy the same world.”156 Europe, in this view, is entering a ‘post-historical 
paradise’ of peace and prosperity in realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace.’ It rejects 
the exercise of unconstrained power and instead believes in the means of diplomacy 
and international law to achieve foreign policy ends. The United States, on the 
contrary,  
“remained mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world 
where international law and rules are unreliable and where true security and 
the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession 
and use of military might.”157  
The main source for this “strategic chasm”158 is the transatlantic power gap that has 
also opened a broad ‘ideological’ gap between Europe and the United States. 
Moreover, the disagreement between the stronger and the weaker manifests itself in 
the current transatlantic dispute about U.S. unilateralism and the issue of burden-
sharing. While NATO has served as a powerful vehicle in establishing the favorable 
European order after World War II, the divergent paths taken by the United States 
and Europe ever since have gradually led to a staggering gap in military capabilities 
and the resulting disparity of military power that account for NATO’s waning military 
importance.  
Due to their aging populations, weak economic performances and soaring budget 
deficits, European allies are assumed to remain in this position. Accordingly, the 
United States should not require Europe ‘to join the posse’ and follow up on demands 
to scale up defense spending so that European allies can become the United States’ 
‘junior partner’ in meeting threats that Europeans find strongly exaggerated.  
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“Why should we [the United States] be greater advocates of European power 
than the Europeans themselves? They have practiced international affairs long 
enough to know that diminished power means diminished influence – and a 
radically diminished NATO, their place at the decision-making table.”159 
While NATO may still play a role in peacekeeping missions, it has become useless 
for waging war and is therefore ‘finished’ as a serious military alliance, according to 
leading neoconservative voices. However, given U.S. power under the condition of 
unipolarity, the United States can best prepare for and respond to the strategic 
challenges around the world without European help. Furthermore, “[i]f Americans and 
Europeans no longer agree on the utility and morality of power, what remains to 
undergird their military alliance?”160 At best, ‘coalitions of the willing’ could be 
assembled to complement U.S. forces. Given its current role in international relations 
as an order-preserving force, however, the United States would be better off by not 
succumbing to multilateral decisionmaking; in short, the United States “must not be 
tied by Lilliputians.”161 As Richard Perle, a leading neoconservative political figure, 
claims, “[a]t the end of the day, (…) we have to defend the American people, and if 
no one else is with us, then we will defend ourselves alone. No American president 
can concede that responsibility to a coalition or to anyone else.”162 
However, Kagan addresses a paradox that reveals a fundamental tension between 
the faith in the necessity to wield military power on the one hand, and the claim to do 
so consistent with moral standards on the other. As Kagan admits: ”The problem the 
United States faces today is (…) profound. It is a problem of legitimacy.”163 It is, he 
observes, deeply rooted in the emergence of a unipolar order since the end of the 
Cold War. “The problem is, to the liberal democratic mind there is something 
inherently illegitimate about a unipolar world (…).”164 Referring to the run-up of the 
Iraq war when the United States sought legitimization at the United Nations, Kagan 
argues that the United States needed the support of at least Great Britain.  
“Why? Not because British troops were essential to the success of the 
invasion. It was the patina of international legitimacy that Tony Blair’s support 
provided – a legitimacy that the American people wanted and needed as the 
Bush administration well understood. Nor can there be any question that the 
Bush administration has suffered from its failure to gain the broader approval 
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of Europe, and thus a broader international legitimacy, for the invasion of Iraq 
– and suffered at home as well as abroad. (…) Europe matters because 
Europe and the United States remain the heart of the liberal, democratic 
world.”165  
Thus, it is doubtful whether the United States could operate effectively without the 
legitimacy-building support of the Europeans since constant charges of illegitimacy 
may eventually erode domestic support for U.S. action abroad. As Kagan admits: ”In 
the end, it is America’s need for legitimacy that will prove more decisive in shaping 
America’s course.”166 According to Kagan, to counter this unipolar predicament, the 
United States needs to demonstrate that it wields its power on behalf of its principles. 
“The United States, in short, must pursue legitimacy in the manner truest to its 
nature, by promoting the principles of liberal democracy, not only as a means to 
greater security but as an end in itself.”167 Especially the situation in post-war Iraq 
has emphasized the notion that the United States may need international 
legitimization to a certain degree to sustain its preeminence. As Donnelly concludes, 
institutionalizing the current ‘Pax Americana’ to a certain extent is therefore 
unavoidable.168 This argument is also advanced in the neoconservative discussion of 
NATO enlargement that is regarded to have major political benefits in store for the 
United States.  
First, NATO may prove vital to gain legitimizing support of Eastern and Central 
European states. Given the fundamental differences between Europe and the United 
States, for neoconservatives, the key challenge today is not that Europe might 
become more powerful, but rather that its ‘lowest-common-denominator-politics’ will 
rob the United States of its most vital allies in Central and Eastern Europe that 
remain necessary for legitimizing U.S. action abroad. With continued European 
integration, Central and Eastern Europe’s ‘gratitude’ may fade, as they become 
economically more dependent on Western Europe. Moreover, Russia is expected to 
be drawn into the orbit of the EU rather than maintain close ties with the United 
States. Germany and France are assumed to lead Europe in the future, rather than 
Great Britain, given its Atlanticist attitude.169 In order to effectively counter these 
developments, the maintenance of NATO will remain vital for the United States. 
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Therefore, although it cannot follow any military functions any more, it should neither 
cease to exist. 
Second, NATO will also remain an important vehicle for the United States to maintain 
and expand its hegemony in Europe. In this context, it may also serve as an 
incubator for continued Russian integration. Thus, NATO is slowly evolving into a 
“transatlantic club of advanced democracies” that will serve purely political functions 
in providing a platform for political consultations.170 NATO’s irrelevance in military 
terms is thus further underscored; however, as a political instrument to ensure 
legitimization, it remains relevant for the United States.  
Third, NATO also continues to provide a platform from which to reach out to regions 
of strategic interest such as the Middle East. As Boot maintains in this context, not 
permitting Turkey into the EU despite its NATO membership since 1952, “represents 
a spectacular bit of geopolitical folly.”171 Therefore, in order to continue to integrate 
Turkey into the league of Western nations, NATO will remain a useful tool. 
Furthermore, Boot complains that “[w]hile being tough on the friendly Turks, Europe 
has a long history of appeasing terrorists and rogue rulers, from Moammar Gadhafi to 
Saddam Hussein.”172 In a post-9/11 world, Europe may be accused of seeking to buy 
the goodwill of terrorists. Thus, “NATO’s continuing purpose is to save Europe from 
the consequences of its own strategic nearsightedness and moral obtuseness.”173  
Finally, NATO should not be abandoned since it constitutes an integral part of a 
“world order conducive to American interests and principles”174 and continues to be a 
means to promote U.S. interests and liberal democratic principles. After all, “it is more 
than a cliché that the United States and Europe share a set of common Western 
beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity 
of power has now put them in very different places.”175 
 
3.3.3 Strategy: NATO as a Political Club 
Due to the premium neoconservatives place on U.S. freedom of action in pursuing 
security policies, they take an unsentimental view on alliances and are frustrated with 
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entangling multinational organizations, regimes, and treaties. In this context, NATO is 
considered militarily dead and is regarded to have evolved into little more than a 
political ‘talk-shop.’176 However, while Europe does not matter as much as it did in the 
past, it neither has become irrelevant. The need for political legitimization from 
democratic countries is most likely to be satisfied by Central and Eastern European 
countries within NATO. In addition, due to NATO’s political functions, it has the 
capacity to reach out to strategically relevant regions. Ironically, NATO will remain 
useful precisely because of its political benefits. Therefore, its political functions must 
be strengthened. Given the neoconservative approach and outlook, however, they do 
not advance policy proposals as distinct as libertarians. Rather, they draw a more 
general picture of  future U.S. policies vis-à-vis NATO. 
Policymakers should work to further transform NATO into a political body that 
provides a platform for gaining political legitimization and international support. To 
achieve this aim, the United States should work behind the scenes to strengthen ties 
with likely European partners, while simultaneously forestalling as much as possible 
the centralization of European security policy. In this context, giving Poland its own 
sector in Iraq is regarded as a strategic move to boost ‘new Europe.’ Such 
proceeding would strengthen the U.S. position in Europe and further promote its 
interests. In addition, U.S. policymakers should acknowledge that Europeans do not 
have the abilities to considerably constrain the United States. Therefore, the United 
States may show some generosity of spirit vis-à-vis Europe. In this context, Kagan 
also warns that “if Americans were to decide that Europe was no more than an 
irritating irrelevancy, would American society gradually become unmoored from what 
we now call the West? It is not a risk to be taken lightly, on either side of the 
Atlantic.”177 NATO must therefore continue to represent a political tool for the United 
States, although it has become entirely superfluous as a military alliance.  
 
3.3.4 Summing Up 
According to the neoconservative perspective, NATO is irrelevant as a military 
alliance due to U.S. hegemonic provision of security. Given current U.S. military 
power and the assumed stability of the unipolar structure of international relations, 
military alliances are not considered necessary. Rather, the United States should 
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avoid getting entangled in multinational decisionmaking in order to pursue its foreign 
policy goals. However, to secure the political legitimization necessary to maintain 
domestic support for U.S. military action abroad and in order not to harm the 
international order the United States seeks to establish, NATO will remain politically 
relevant in the future. Furthermore, NATO constitutes a vehicle to reach out to 
strategically relevant regions and to secure and expand U.S. hegemony on the 
European continent. To achieve these ends, NATO should be transformed into a 
‘political club’ that will provide the political support necessary to pursue U.S. foreign 
policy goals and maintain U.S. benevolent hegemony.  
 
3.4 The Case for NATO as a Well-equipped Toolbox 
 
Conservative scholars178 mostly affiliated with the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson 
Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute maintain that NATO is no longer 
strategically and politically flexible enough to cope with current security threats due to 
the large capabilities gap between the United States and Europe. Consequently, 
Europeans resent U.S. power, despite their military weakness. Due to the 
assumptions of structural realism applied by conservative scholars, resentment will 
ultimately lead to counterbalancing behavior in the long run. With regard to the issues 
of burden-sharing and NATO enlargement, conservative scholars reach two 
conclusions. First, NATO enlargement will provide the United States with allies 
supportive of U.S. action. Central and Eastern European countries will constitute a 
balancing weight against Western European countries, thus keeping Western Europe 
– especially France and Germany – in check. Second, to prevent Europe from 
freeriding on the expense of the United States, European NATO allies must upgrade 
their capabilities in order to provide the United States with relevant niche 
contributions. In this context, conservative scholars advance the case of NATO as a 
well-equipped toolbox for future ‘coalitions of the willing.’ Therefore, 
“NATO is nowhere near as useless as its detractors suggest, nor is it as 
seminal as its proponents blithely assert. What is needed is a new syntax to 
discuss the post-9/11 alliance that moves away from the stale theology that 
itself is impeding successful reform of NATO. (…) In the new era, NATO will 
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be an important politico-military option on both American and European 
policymakers’ menus, while ceasing to be the only game in town.”179  
In the following, the approach, the line of argument, as well as the policy 
recommendations advanced by this camp are sketched out. 
 
3.4.1 Approach 
Conservatives maintain that current dissonances in transatlantic relations are about 
far more than “carping, black-leather-clad, ineffectual Europeans, glowering about 
American dominance from the safety of a Parisian café.”180 On the contrary, the 
reasons for this ‘resurgence’ are to be seen in structural developments in the 
international system that are likely to endure and entail far-reaching consequences 
for the conduct of transatlantic security relations. In contrast to neoconservative 
scholars, conservatives thus reject the notion that Americans and Europeans are not 
from the same planet. On the contrary, as John Hulsman, scholar at the Heritage 
Foundation, maintains, 
“[a]ny thought that classical balance-of-power thinking was no longer relevant 
in today’s global environment, ought to be put to rest by any vague scrutiny of 
the French government’s rationale for a more coherent Europe.”181  
Accordingly, conservative scholars adopt a structural realist approach and outline 
their arguments against the theoretical assumptions of the structural anarchy of the 
international system, the principle of self-help of security-seeking states, and the 
balance of power as the most stable international structure.182  
 
3.4.2 Line of Argument 
Conservative scholars maintain that while the United States has emerged as the sole 
remaining superpower after the end of the Cold War, Western European states have 
remained regional powers. However,  
“[n]ot only has America gone from strength to strength in the new era, but 
Europe also has conspicuously failed to emerge as a coherent power in its 
own right. This sense of a resurgent and increasingly unfettered America, 
coupled with an introverted, increasingly marginalized Europe, does much to 
explain not only the differences in policy between the two poles, but also the 
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increased virulence many Europeans feel toward American policies with which 
they disagree.”183 
Today, the United States is confronted with a paradox: “Military weakness, economic 
stagnation, and political disunity – this is the reality that confronts American decision-
makers today when looking at Europe.”184 However, although Europe is militarily 
weak and therefore not likely to seriously challenge the United States in the near 
future, especially ‘old Europe’ – namely France and Germany – seems to get ever 
more ‘Gaullist’ – at least in rhetoric. The notion of this paradox serves as a guideline 
for conservative analysis and the respective policy recommendations that connect 
the issues of burden-sharing and NATO enlargement against the background of a 
structural realist approach to international affairs.  
In discussing the future role and function of NATO in transatlantic security politics, 
conservative scholars are especially concerned with the differences in military 
capabilities between the United States and Europe.185 They argue that the 
transatlantic problem of burden-sharing has come to the fore after the end of the Cold 
War and was made explicit in the Kosovo campaign that portrayed European military 
ineffectiveness.186  
“The result has been an alliance that is in danger of not being interoperable, 
that possesses a cumbersome decision-making structure, and that places 
around 85 percent of the total NATO capability on one pillar.”187 
While conservative scholars admit that records of European defense spending 
remain mixed, they observe that, while some European states have made 
considerable efforts to adapt to the new security environment, most “continue to take 
a strategic holiday.”188 Hulsman argues that such large disparity in military 
capabilities is not sustainable, neither operationally nor politically in the new security 
environment ushered in by the 9/11 attacks.189  
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Due to Europe’s ‘anemic’ defense spending, a direct involvement of NATO in future 
U.S. military operations is unlikely. Conservatives maintain that in the war in 
Afghanistan, the Pentagon decided that it was not worth working through the 
cumbersome NATO decisionmaking structure to add Europe’s limited capabilities to 
its own. According to Hulsman, 
“[s]uch a public breakdown of the central relevance of NATO merely confirmed 
what many of us have been warning for years. It signalled that the long-term 
rot at the heart of NATO – the burden-sharing/power-sharing controversy – 
has finally led to unquestionable damage.”190  
Today, NATO lies at the ruins of the burden-sharing disparities, with the United 
States being increasingly unwilling to consult with European allies, and (Western) 
Europe becoming ever more resentful of U.S. power and its willingness to use it.191 
This situation, however, entails serious consequences for the conduct of U.S. 
security politics and leads conservative scholars to assume that NATO should be 
preserved despite its lack of military capabilities. 
First, conservative scholars observe that European ‘Gaullists’ increasingly turn to the 
European Union as an alternative model to NATO in security politics. In this context, 
the announcement of France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium to establish 
separate EU military headquarters with an independent planning capacity in 
Tervuren, Belgium, within the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the 
run-up of the Iraq war are interpreted as firm ‘Gaullist’ efforts to create a 
counterweight to the United States and to lessen the U.S. role in Europe. Currently, 
any desire to compete effectively with the Unites States is curtailed by European 
military weakness relative to U.S. capabilities; however, Radek Sikorski from the 
American Enterprise Institute points to the fact that a Europe with independent 
military capabilities at its disposal would necessarily think of itself in terms of 
competition and comparison vis-à-vis the United States.192  
“A Europe with its own military capability will more frequently say ‘No’ to the 
United States on a plethora of international issues and, unlike today, that may 
not mean resentful acquiescence but active opposition.”193  
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Second, a non-NATO defense establishment in Europe might eventually start to seek 
allies other than the United States; instead, states such as Russia and China may 
become partners in the balancing game against the United States. A non-Atlanticist 
Europe might constitute a more viable partner for the United States considering 
current power disparities; however, given current trends, the United States will more 
likely encounter a strong Europe seeking to counterbalance the United States by 
forging alliances with different partners.194 
Third, in the long run ‘new Europe’ is assumed to adapt to Franco-German terms of 
integration. Great Britain is presumed to complete its internal realignment and 
become, with its Atlanticist ties curtailed, a “true European social democracy.”195 In 
short, while U.S. supporters in Europe would be weakened without continued U.S. 
presence in Europe, U.S. potential rivals would be boosted. With EU enlargement 
accomplished in May 2004, Europe’s pull on Central and Eastern Europe is assumed 
to further multiply. As Sikorski recommends: “If the United States wants to remain a 
player [in Europe], it better get into the game.”196 In brief, considering these 
arguments, the United States can neither afford to withdraw from NATO, nor let it 
continue to falter; European counterbalancing efforts would be the ultimate result.  
In this context, the issue of NATO expansion is addressed and assumed to hold 
major political benefits in store. First, NATO expansion is expected to help work on 
the maintenance of U.S. presence in Europe and the continued pursuit of its vital 
security interests through NATO. Hulsman and Dale maintain that “[i]n Europe, with 
the honorable exception of Great Britain, the general rule of thumb is that the farther 
east one moves across the continent, the more pro-American the leaders are.”197 
Eastern European states supportive of U.S. policies are therefore assumed to have 
the potential to counterbalance Western European states that are perceived as 
‘Gaullist,’ thus bringing a pro-American “critical mass” into NATO.198 
Second, given the military and strategic capabilities gap between the United States 
and any of its partners, the kind of support the United States needs today is largely 
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symbolic and political in nature. NATO enlargement therefore provides the United 
States with the allies needed to achieve this end, since “[t]his is the kind of support 
that Eastern European countries could easily and willingly provide, despite their 
shaky economies.”199 By gaining this support from ‘new Europe,’ the United States 
may therefore not only perform an intra-European balancing act, but simultaneously 
push much of ‘old’ Western Europe into strategic irrelevance.200  
Third, NATO enlargement can also be viewed as a means to significantly increase 
the number of possible military partners for the United States in assembling and 
conducting ‘coalitions of the willing.’201 Taking the current capabilities gap between 
the United States and Europe as well as internal European cleavages into 
consideration, Hulsman maintains that a “two-tiered NATO is bound to emerge.”202 
The first tier will continue to preserve the Article 5 commitment of collective self-
defense. The second tier – that is also expected to evolve into the more vibrant one – 
will involve ‘coalitions of the willing’ emerging from Brussels as “the likely diplomatic 
and military configuration of choice.”203 In this context, Central and Eastern European 
countries substantially increase the number of likely partners in favor of U.S. policies 
and ready to join coalitions of the willing.  
This analysis, however, presents conservative scholars with a dilemma: While NATO seems 
unsustainable due to the large capabilities gap, it continues to remain the most important 
vehicle for the United States to remain a European player. In this context, conservative 
scholars switch back to the issue of burden-sharing in arguing that European allies cannot be 
given a ‘free ride’ any more, since this will ultimately weaken the U.S. position. Thus, while 
the United States must remain committed to the transatlantic link in order to remain a 
‘European power,’ U.S. policymakers must also promote serious changes in NATO’s military 
configuration. In this context, conservatives argue that NATO must be strengthened militarily 
in order to function as a reliable forum to assemble coalitions of the willing.204  
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3.4.3 Strategy: Transforming NATO into a Toolbox 
NATO has proven next to useless as a military alliance in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, while continuing to be a vehicle to ensure U.S. presence in Europe; 
remaining a ‘European power’ will constitute a vital security interest for the United 
States, given current ‘Gaullist rhetoric’ and soft balancing attempts in Western 
Europe that might eventually lead to more serious balancing efforts. NATO 
enlargement will provide an internal balancing weight to keep ‘Gaullist’ Europe in 
check and gradually push it into strategic irrelevance. Furthermore, an enlarged 
NATO will provide the United States with well-functioning ‘coalitions of the willing.’ 
However, in order to make this approach work, NATO’s military capabilities must be 
enhanced, and its structure must be made more flexible. The overall strategic vision 
of the United States should therefore be to maintain NATO and transform it into a 
well-equipped ‘toolbox’ for future coalitions of the willing. In serving a more 
instrumentalist purpose, NATO will also ensure its usefulness well into the future.205 
In the following, an overview of the comprehensive policy recommendations 
advanced by scholars with a conservative perspective and embodying both military 
and political dimensions will be provided. 
In military terms, policymakers should pursue four goals, two of which have already 
been accomplished: Creating a vehicle for a strategic dialogue with Russia, ensuring 
a robust second round of enlargement, promoting the Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF), and pushing for the technological modernization of European militaries. The 
first two goals have already been achieved by having enlarged NATO and 
established the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002. In the following, CJFT and the 
NATO Response Force are discussed.206  
First, CJTF should be explicitly recognized as the tool that will allow NATO to 
establish greater alliance flexibility in both decisionmaking and crisis-response. 
Initially endorsed at the NATO Summit in Brussels in 1994, it enables allies to meet 
security challenges that do not threaten the primary security interests of all NATO 
members alike.207 While the consensus-rule has so far only allowed for a full 
engagement of all members in NATO action or, respectively, prevented one from 
occurring, CJTF provides a third option by allowing for the usage of NATO assets by 
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alliance members without all members explicitly endorsing the ensuing military 
action.208 At the same time, the United States’ ability to prevent the alliance to act in 
ways not coherent with the pursuit of U.S. security interests is maintained by 
retaining NATO’s consensus-blocking power. CJTF also constitutes an instrument 
that facilitates the process of assembling and conducting missions of ‘coalitions of the 
willing.’ The CJTF process should therefore be made a central point in future 
deliberations about reforms in NATO’s decisionmaking structure.209 
“In an era where American and European interests are at best complementary, 
but certainly not identical, this ‘yes, but’ option is imperative. Rather than 
dragging member states into secondary interest missions or forcing 
unopposed yet disinterested nations to prevent a mission from occurring 
altogether, CJTFs provide NATO with a third political answer through which 
both European allies and the U.S. can decide not to stand in the way of a 
mission yet opt not to directly participate in it.”210 
Second, the multinational NATO Response Force should also constitute a necessary 
component of a strategic reconfiguration of NATO. With approximately 21,000 allied 
troops, this force should be able to deploy out-of-area on seven days’ notice.211 Such 
a force would not only enhance allies’ capabilities, but also ensure the deployment of 
relevant niche contributions from member states, demonstrating that NATO is still 
founded on a common military approach and outlook. This may also be an option for 
the Europeans to re-engage in the shared technological modernization of the alliance 
and reduce the gap in capabilities.212 
With regards to NATO enlargement, conservatives furthermore argue that in addition 
to current membership standards set forth by the Membership Action Plan and the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) that are largely political in nature, an additional standard 
for prospective members must be established. New NATO members should also 
have to recognize that today’s challenges have to be met by action running beyond 
the declaration of Article 5. The decision to join NATO must therefore entail both the 
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willingness and ability of new members to contribute to potential out-of-area 
missions.  
Apart from fulfilling mere political accession standards, candidate states and new 
members should therefore also be judged on their ability to develop capabilities and 
resources that would be useful to equip coalitions of the willing, thus acting as a 
‘force provider’ for the United States. 
In political terms, a comforting conclusion can be drawn out of the paradoxical 
situation in Europe the United States is confronted with. According to Hulsman,  
“[t]he very lack of European unity that hamstrings European Gaullist efforts to 
challenge the United States presents America with a unique opportunity. If 
Europe is more about diversity than uniformity, if the concept of a unified 
‘Europe’ has yet to really exist, then a general American transatlantic foreign 
policy based on cherry-picking – engaging coalitions of the willing European 
allies on a case-by-case basis – becomes entirely possible.”213 
‘Cherry-picking’214 represents an overall strategy that will serve U.S. interests and 
provide it with the possibility to cope with existing realities. It constitutes a tool that 
enables the United States to manage transatlantic relations while remaining engaged 
on a continent “that will rarely be wholly for, or wholly against, specific American 
foreign policy initiatives.”215 
In order for ‘cherry-picking’ to work politically, the United States must find the 
divisions in European opinion based on differing conceptions of national interest and 
use them to form coalitions of the willing on any given policy initiative. This policy 
outline, which is considered to be essentially realist in approach and outlook, 
therefore calls for enhanced diplomatic efforts on the part of the United States in 
order to remain ‘up-to-date’ in European affairs. If full support on a given issue is not 
forthcoming in NATO, cherry-pickers will continue to invest diplomatic efforts in order 
to assemble coalitions of the willing within NATO by exploiting existing cleavages on 
a given policy issue in Europe. Thus, a Europe that is shaped up in military 
capabilities, but remains deeply divided over how to position itself towards U.S. 
policies perfectly suits U.S. interests:  
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“Its [Europe’s] member states are capable of assisting the U.S. when their 
interests coincide with America’s; yet it is too feeble to easily block America 
over fundamental issues of national security.”216 
In combining the military and political dimensions of their proposed strategy, 
conservatives argue that CJTFs will constitute a suitable instrument for coalitions of 
the willing to be assembled. Due to the assets of interoperability and common 
standards, assembling coalitions of the willing outside NATO or taking unilateral 
action should therefore remain a last resort.217 In short, a strategy to create coalitions 
of the willing within NATO 
“will preserve a status quo where the transatlantic relationship, despite fraying 
a bit at the edges, continues to provide common goods to both sides of the 
Atlantic. Such an overall policy acknowledges an awkward current truth of the 
transatlantic relationship: The United States wants Europe neither to be too 
successful nor to fail. As such, the Europe of today suits America’s long-term 
strategic interests.”218  
The New Atlantic Initiative (NAI), sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, and 
drawing on the efforts of a network of European policy research organizations, 
represents an attempt to further develop and implement these proposals. NAI, 
chaired by Radek Sikorski, aims to revitalize transatlantic political, economic, and 
security institutions and to integrate the new democracies of Central and Eastern 
Europe into these institutions. It regularly sponsors conferences, debates, and 
seminars on both sides of the Atlantic and publishes reports and policy papers on 
issues such as trade liberalization, European integration, and NATO security matters. 
NAI’s central objective is to strengthen Atlantic cooperation in the post-Cold War 
world by bringing together Americans and Europeans to work toward common 
goals.219 
 
3.4.4 Summing Up 
With regards to NATO conservatives argue that although it has become almost 
useless as a military alliance due to the huge capabilities gap between the United 
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(accessed 20 April 2004). 
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States and Europe, it remains a vehicle enabling the United States to pursue its 
security interests in Europe. An enlarged NATO provides the United States with 
‘allies’ to keep European ‘Gaullist’ counterbalancing efforts in check. Furthermore, 
NATO represents a pool for coalitions of the willing. A strategy of ‘cherry-picking’ will 
enable the United States to maintain the status quo, prevent a unified European rival 
from emerging, and gain substantial support for military action. Militarily, policy-
makers should work to make NATO more flexible to facilitate the implementation of a 
strategy of ‘cherry-picking.’ This rather instrumentalist view of NATO will also keep it 
relevant in the future. According to conservatives, NATO should constitute a toolbox 
that will be used frequently, though not necessarily. Thus, NATO can remain “the 
bedrock of our common security, and we can both use it as a toolbox for those 
actions that the other side does not object to, but feels no inclination to get involved 
in. We can be Europe and America, but we are also the Western civilization, with 
NATO as our invincible arm.”220  
 
3.5 The Case for a New Transatlantic Bargain 
 
Liberal scholars221 honor NATO as “a unique and invaluable alliance that has 
continued to function as a reliable instrument for multilateral military cooperation after 
the end of the Cold War,”222 thus still constituting “the most important diplomatic 
relationship in the world.”223 They argue that the alliance’s outreach programs as well 
as the two rounds of  NATO enlargement have continued to constitute the core of 
U.S. security policy in Europe in the 1990s.224 Notwithstanding this initial success-
story, liberals are concerned that current transatlantic differences will entail the 
“effective end of Atlanticism.”225 In adopting a neo-liberal institutionalist approach, 
analysts address a fundamental paradox: While NATO’s long-term potential in 
helping to promote peace and democracy could be assessed as limitless, its ultimate 
cohesion is supposed to be at risk. Furthermore, liberals maintain that “these days 
the many allies are feeling not so much led by the United States as bossed around; 
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at the Brookings Foundation, Celeste A. Wallander from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
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222 Wallander 2002, 2. 
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for them, the exercise of American power has become less a source of protection 
and more a cause of resentment and a problem to be managed.”226 Liberals advance 
three proposals to deal with NATO. First, NATO needs to adjust to new realities in 
order to remain a useful political and military instrument for both sides of the Atlantic. 
Second, NATO’s institutional shortcomings need to be addressed. Third, the U.S. 
foreign policy course must be corrected. Europe and the United States should work 
jointly to strike a new transatlantic bargain and keep NATO relevant well into the 
future. In the following, the approach, line of argument, as well as policy 
recommendations advanced by this camp are sketched out. 
 
3.5.1 Approach 
Liberal scholars argue that “the age of global politics has begun.”227 It replaces the 
interplay among states and confronts the United States with a new international 
environment. In this context, liberal scholars argue that the 9/11 attacks were 
symptomatic for the advent of the era of global politics characterized by complex 
interdependence.228 The rapid forces of Globalization229 “unleashed economic, 
political and social forces that are beyond the control of any one country, including 
the United States.”230 Globalization is therefore regarded as a decisive factor that 
changes the very nature of international relations and renders realist assumptions 
insufficient: Rather, the territorial state is eclipsed by non-state actors that diminish 
the sovereignty of the nation-state.231 Policymaking does not remain in the monopoly 
                                                 
226 Talbott 2002, 47. 
227 Daalder/Lindsay 2003a. 
228 In a situation of interdependence or mutual dependence actors’ behavior is determined or significantly 
affected by external forces; interdependent situations are therefore characterized by reciprocal effects among 
actors. These effects often result from international transactions – flows of money, goods, people, and messages. 
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the distinction between joint gains and losses versus relative gains and losses see also Keohane/ Nye 1989. 
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interdependence in the realms of communication technology, economics, politics, and environment. It is not an 
entirely new phenomenon; what distinguishes today’s Globalization from yesterday’s, however, is the speed and 
volume of its cross-border contacts. Daalder/Lindsay 2003a, 296ff.   
230 Daalder 2003, 151. See also Daalder/Lindsay 2003a, 288. 
231 Keohane/Nye 1989. Dunne points out, however, that neo-liberal institutionalists assume that non-state actors 
are subordinate to states. Furthermore, they also accept the structural anarchy of the international system that 
realism proposes. Dunne 2001, 176.    
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of the state any more; it is rather directed and influenced through multiple channels, 
many of which are non-state.  
In an era of Globalization, international conflict will not disappear. On the contrary, it 
will take new shape, and may even increase. As Keohane and Nye point out, “[w]e 
must therefore be cautious about the prospect that rising interdependence is creating 
a brave new world of cooperation to replace the bad old world of international 
conflict.”232 Instead, Globalization brings new perils; borders become porous to new 
challenges such as drug trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and international terrorism. Globalization is thus putting new items on the agenda; 
simultaneously, many issues cannot be resolved by individual states due to their 
complex nature. Furthermore, a clear hierarchy of issues and a distinction between 
‘high’ and ‘low’ politics does not exist any more as realism assumes. Rather, the pure 
want for survival is substituted by a more complex set of interlocking preferences in 
an interdependent world. 
Shaping policy in a globalized world will incur costs that need to be carefully weighed. 
In order to do so, policymakers and analysts must examine underlying patterns of 
vulnerability233 before adopting a specific policy, and give special attention to the 
question, what costs will be incurred for oneself and others by so doing.234  
The use of force will nonetheless remain the most important component of national 
power, since it is ultimately necessary to guarantee survival. Military power continues 
to predominate economic power, since economic power is likely to be ineffective 
against the serious use of military force.235 However, force is regarded as an 
increasingly ineffective instrument of politics, since exercising more dominant forms 
of power will entail higher costs without guaranteeing the achievement of the desired 
outcome.236 Furthermore, using force against a state on one issue will most likely 
interrupt gaining potential benefits on another one.237 Thus, the use of force is likely 
to be constrained under conditions of interdependence; no actor can enforce its will 
on others any more or will only do so at harmful costs.  
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Drawing on Nye’s findings, analysts with a neoliberal institutionalist perspective argue 
that Globalization transforms the nature of power itself: “Power today is distributed 
among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess 
game.”238 The first dimension remains the realm of military power, in which the United 
States has unrivalled advantages. The second one is made up by economic power, 
which is distributed in a multipolar world. The third dimension relates to transnational 
relations, in which power distribution is widely dispersed and beyond governmental 
control. Consequently, 
“[t]hose who recommend a hegemonic American foreign policy (…) are relying 
on woefully inadequate analysis. When you are in a three-dimensional game, 
you will lose if you focus on the interstate military board and fail to notice the 
other boards and the vertical connections among them.”239  
Accordingly, a dominant power such as the United States is not only bound to lead, 
but, and more importantly so, “bound to cooperate.”240 
Multinational and international organizations gain relevance in coalition-building and 
provide a platform to jointly address complex issues that cannot be resolved by the 
state alone.241 Furthermore, as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay point out, 
“[c]ooperative structures that provide for repeated interactions over time create the 
opportunity to turn separate national interests into shared ones.”242 Since it has 
become much harder to “get others to want what you want” in an interdependent 
world, international coalitions and alliances must be mobilized to influence other 
states’ policies. Thus, the “institutionalization”243 of commonly established ‘rules of 
the game’ lies within the vital interests of states acting under the conditions of 
interdependence. Cooperation therefore may become long-term and is no longer tied 
to basic survival interests of states, as the realist approach suggests; rather, it is 
assumed to possess a value of its own. 
 
3.5.2 Line of Argument 
Liberals maintain that under conditions of complex interdependence, the United 
States cannot dictate its policy preferences to the world, confident that others will 
                                                 
238 Nye 2002, 39. 
239 Nye 2002, 39. 
240 Nye 2002, xiv. In this context, Nye also speaks of the “paradox of American power.” 
241 Keohane/Nye 1989, 35. This argument distinguishes neo-liberal institutionalist thinkers from realists. See also 
Dunne 2001, 171.  
242 Daalder/Lindsay 2003a, 311. 
243 Neo-liberal institutionalism represents a very distinct strand within liberal thinking. For an extensive 
description see Dunne 2001, 164ff. 
  56
follow. The exercise of “soft power”244 and the creation of a lasting international order 
based on cooperation are therefore assumed critical in sustaining U.S. primacy.245 
Therefore, crucial and complex problems defy purely unilateralist solutions. With 
regard to transatlantic security relations, liberals argue that Europe and the United 
States differ on a variety of issues; however, they still share the same values and the 
notion of common threats; transatlantic differences can therefore be resolved by 
diplomatic efforts and cooperation in security matters.  
In this context, liberal scholars disparage current U.S. policies as “unilateralism on 
steroids”246 and complain that „[o]ne of the most striking consequences of the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy tenure has been the collapse of the Atlantic 
alliance.“247 Sidelining NATO in the war in Afghanistan and especially in Iraq 
constituted a “spectacular political train wreck.”248 The assumption that the United 
States, because of its military power, has the ability to go it alone, is perceived as 
extremely short-sighted, the argumentation that alliances are no longer needed is 
”both wrong and dangerous.”249  
For liberals, the collapse of NATO’s relevance in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
came on the heels of the alliance’s renaissance in the 1990s. During this time, NATO 
evolved from a collective defense organization into Europe’s main security institution, 
helping stabilize the Balkans, establishing military practices with 27 partnership 
countries, forging new relationships with erstwhile adversaries, and engaging Russia 
in the NATO-Russia-Council. As Talbott maintains, NATO enlargement further 
contributed to the post-Cold War consolidation of this “security solar system.”250 After 
the 9/11 attacks, however, NATO’s confidence-building role has been increasingly 
marginalized.251  
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According to their approach, liberal scholars claim that in a world characterized by 
complex interdependence, it would be a mistake to base U.S. foreign policy on the 
principle that European support for U.S. action is neither possible nor necessary. 
However, in order to reinforce NATO and to prepare it to fulfill ambitious new 
agendas, liberals argue that NATO must adapt to new realities; until now, as Asmus 
points out “[w]e have the best alliance in the world to deal with the least threat, and 
we don’t have an alliance to deal with the most likely threat.”252 In short, while NATO 
is regarded as having much to offer, it must make itself relevant again.253 In this 
context, liberals especially connect the issue of burden-sharing with the prospect of a 
‘new transatlantic bargain.’ 
“Overcoming the current transatlantic rift will require (…) bold rethink. After 
September 11 and Iraq, the United States and Europe must (…) coalesce 
around a new purpose and a new grand strategy, one fit to meet a different set 
of challenges beyond Europe.”254  
While some scholars remain sceptical that the Atlantic alliance can be restored,255 
others more emphatically draft a new transatlantic agenda with NATO as its most 
important instrument. According to this view, NATO should help Russia continue its 
transformation, anchor a democratizing Ukraine to the West and reach out to 
Belarus. NATO allies should also move beyond a strategy to manage the crumbling 
status quo in the Middle East.256 In order to work on this agenda, however, military 
capabilities constitute an “indispensable component.”257 Liberals view the current 
capabilities gap as a most serious problem in recasting a new transatlantic bargain. 
Although Europeans are regarded as contributing a lot to global security,258 liberals 
argue that once again building an explicit partnership with Europe will require 
Europeans to show a willingness to shoulder more of the security burden. NATO 
enlargement is seen to further exacerbate the capabilities problem, since new NATO 
members are not assumed to make substantial military contributions or to be 
structurally equipped to meet new security threats.  
In the context of NATO enlargement, however, some scholars argue that another 
fundamental problem pointing to NATO’s current institutional shortcomings needs to 
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be adequately addressed. While NATO enlargement is commonly assumed to 
provide the opportunity “to lock in democracy and peace in Europe,”259 more 
sceptical scholars point to the fact that the ‘post-communist success stories’ 
celebrated in NATO have turned into tales with rather mixed plotlines. Wallander of 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that within the 
context of NATO enlargement, the very qualities that make NATO work are at risk.260  
“NATO is a uniquely effective multilateral military alliance precisely because it 
is a political security community of countries of common values and 
democratic institutions. NATO works only because it is both military and 
political in nature. Dilute NATO’s coherence, and the result will be a one-
dimensional traditional military alliance that cannot operate effectively.”261 
Thus, apart from the ongoing concerns about NATO’s capabilities, the debate about 
the consequences of enlargement on NATO’s functioning also needs to be 
conducted. In this context, liberals argue that NATO needs to take steps to ensure 
that (prospective) members live up to NATO’s political standards in order to secure 
the alliance’s future coherence and relevance.262  
Since the first round of enlargement, doubts have raised as to whether the new 
members could live up to their commitments not only in military but also in political 
terms once they have been admitted into NATO.263 Prior to accession, the prospect 
of NATO membership had served as a powerful incentive for internal reform as well 
as a driving force of Central and Eastern European integration into Western security 
and economic institutions.264 The most pertinent question liberals address in this 
context is how the incentives for new members to continue on the path of reform in 
accordance with NATO standards can be upheld, once they have officially joined 
NATO. In this context, scholars concerned with NATO’s institutional shortcomings 
argue that it lacks any institutional procedures for dealing with members that violate 
its rules and standards. NATO accession standards should be better safeguarded in 
order to continue to provide an incentive for Central and Eastern European countries 
to engage in reforms after admission.  
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“In fact, this incentive effect is one of the main arguments for the future 
importance of the alliance. If it is true that countries’ adherence to NATO 
standards advances U.S. security, then the question of holding members to 
those standards is not only legitimate but vital to American interests.”265  
Furthermore, adherence to accession standards will also positively affect cooperation 
within NATO military planning. Military interoperability rests on the alliance’s problem-
solving and consensus-finding principles that enable NATO to pursue unified policies. 
Willingness to operate by consensus, however, is derived from trust rooted in 
common interests and values; it constitutes a vital element for the alliance’s 
foundation.266 
“Ultimately, then, NATO works as a military alliance because its members 
share a common heritage of transparent and just government and military 
professionalism in the service of civilian authority. The alliance’s effectiveness 
is unavoidably rooted in the qualities of its members, primarily in their 
democratic values and institutions.”267 
Member states ruled by rather authoritarian or corrupt leaderships may therefore 
result in an ultimate break-up of the alliance, thus severely diminishing its relevance: 
“Like a team, NATO is only as good as its members.”268  
NATO needs to establish rules to deal with those not adhering to standards in order 
to safeguard what is at the foundations of the alliance. In order to remain a relevant 
Western security institution as well as an instrument to provide stability in Central and 
Eastern Europe, NATO must again be based on a common political commitment with 
agreed upon standards beyond mere accession criteria. Mechanisms to effectively 
sanction members need to be put into place; otherwise,  NATO membership will not 
continue to provide incentives for democratic reform and ultimately cease to be an 
effective military and political instrument for the consolidation of security in Europe.269  
 
3.5.3 Strategy: Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain 
Under the conditions of complex interdependence, U.S. policy-makers face the 
challenge of using current U.S. power to create an environment conducive to its 
interests and values by extending the economic and political benefits of 
Globalization, encouraging other powers to work on a liberal international order, 
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stemming and reversing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
confronting threats to global environment.270 In order to effectively implement this 
order, the United States must take the lead in creating and maintaining multilateral 
institutions such as NATO and equip them to handle the challenges of a globalized 
world.271 In conducting a cooperative foreign policy in the age of global politics, the 
United States must furthermore combine power and cooperation.272 Liberals argue 
that while power remains fundamental to the United States’ ability to firmly advocate 
its agenda, it is only through cooperative efforts that the United States can pursue 
and implement its foreign policy goals. Therefore, 
“[t]he point of using American primacy to build cooperative structures is not to 
give foreign capitals a veto over American foreign policy (…). It is instead to 
make the most of American power by maximizing the number of potential 
partners for the United States and deflating the grievances that others have 
against it.”273 
As Daalder and Lindsay point out, arguing that U.S. foreign policy should be either 
unilateral or multilateral is to posit a false choice. Both must be combined and rightly 
used, since “[p]ower without willing cooperation veers toward diktat and breeds 
resentment and resistance. Cooperation without power produces posturing, not 
progress.”274 A more ‘pragmatic’ internationalism should acknowledge that the United 
States does not need to choose between power and cooperation; instead, both 
should guide U.S. foreign policy.275 
In the context of NATO, U.S. policymakers should return to a policy of treating 
Europe as a partner of choice. The hard-line view of the Bush administration 
presented by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should be abandoned. In 
the liberal view, the model of purely relying on ‘coalitions of the willing’ will fail in the 
future. Instead, policymakers must recognize that only a unified and strong Europe 
can constitute a meaningful partner for the United States.276  
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In order to bring about a new transatlantic bargain, Europe will have to shape up its 
military capabilities. In so doing, it should not duplicate U.S. prowess; instead, it 
should raise its capacities to be able to intervene in coalition operations together with 
the United States, to sustain long-term peacekeeping missions, and to act on its own 
in smaller crises. First, it should establish mechanisms for concrete, small-scale 
operations. In this context, the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force 
will provide a first step.277 Second, European NATO member states should commit to 
increasing their defense budgets and making smarter investments in order to improve 
their military capabilities for missions against new security threats.278 Furthermore, 
both sides of the Atlantic need to reinstate a close web of consultations to pull 
together divergent viewpoints on security policies.279  
In the context of NATO enlargement, U.S. policy should strengthen the ability of 
NATO to monitor and coerce compliance with political standards beyond accession. 
Wallander maintains that mechanisms that allow for the reporting on and sanctioning 
of members in the case of misconduct or even failure to comply with the standards 
set out by NATO must be developed. A solution should be sought at two levels.  
First, within the organizational procedures, the creation of a NATO Membership 
Monitoring Committee, subordinate to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that monitors 
and discusses members’ political performance and reports to the NAC on the 
conduct of members, should be considered.280  
Second, a comprehensive revision of the North Atlantic Treaty must take place in 
order to provide for two new features: Since no member is going to agree on its own 
sanctioning or suspension, decisions on membership status must be taken by 
consensus minus one. Article 10 of the Treaty281 would furthermore have to be 
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amended to allow for three different ways of ‘disciplinary action’ against non-
conforming states: Sanctions, suspension of membership, and expulsion.282 
 
3.5.4 Summing Up 
Analysts coming from a liberal perspective and adopting a neo-liberal institutionalist 
approach are strongly in favor of the promotion of democracy by international 
cooperation in multinational organizations and alliances, and of the establishment of 
an international liberal order. However, this is considered a long-term process. In a 
world with states acting under conditions of global interdependence, the use of force 
to achieve this end is too costly and does therefore not represent an effective 
instrument of international relations. Instead, working through multinational 
organizations such as NATO will ensure more positive results. In this view, NATO still 
represents a valuable instrument to address security challenges. Maintaining and 
adapting NATO to new challenges will therefore be in the vital interest of the United 
States. However, with regard to current transatlantic rifts, U.S. unilateralist foreign 
policy and European gaps in defense capabilities and spending, NATO’s relevance 
and coherence are considered to be seriously at risk. While U.S. policymakers should 
press for the enhancement of European capabilities, they should also address 
institutional shortcomings that might endanger consolidating the achievements 
gained in two rounds of NATO enlargement. In order to work on this ambitious 
agenda and to cope with the perils of an interdependent world, the United States 
should rightfully combine power and cooperation. Choosing between ‘unilateralism’ 
and ‘multilateralism’ is positing a false choice; instead, both should be usefully 
merged in order to accomplish an extensive foreign policy agenda.   
 
3.6 Summary 
 
In ‘drawing the map’ of the U.S. debate on NATO, four camps advancing four 
different cases on U.S. NATO politics can be distinguished. The first step of the 
analysis described their lines of argument against the background of their respective 
approach. The findings can be summarized as follows.  
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1. Scholars from the libertarian Cato Institute adopt a structural realist approach. 
They regard NATO as a systemic anomaly that needs to be corrected since it 
exposes the United States to incalculable security risks. Accordingly, they promote 
U.S. strategic withdrawal from Europe. Thus, scholars coming from a libertarian 
perspective adopt a neo-isolationist approach in the realm of security politics.  
2. Neoconservatives believe in unipolarity and the prevalence of U.S. power and 
combine this view with the claim for the pursuit of moral objectives in foreign policy. 
NATO, while being irrelevant in military terms, may therefore continue to serve as a 
tool for gaining political legitimization. Consequently, neoconservatives make the 
case for transforming NATO into a political club of like-minded societies led by a 
benevolent hegemon that provides for comprehensive security. While the 
neoconservative approach is largely ‘unilateralist,’ this line of argument also reveals a 
fundamental tension between the advocated politics of power and the claim to 
conduct a ‘morally sound’ policy. 
3. Conservatives advance their arguments against the backgdrop of structural realist 
thinking. While regarding NATO as a vehicle for remaining a European power to keep 
‘Gaullist’ Europe in check, they also advocate for military upgrades in NATO in order 
to prevent European freeriding. They make the case for NATO as a well-equipped 
toolbox that would help implement U.S. political and military objectives in Europe.  
4. Scholars adopting a neo-liberal institutionalist approach argue that a new 
transatlantic bargain in military and political terms should provide a new basis for a 
cooperative transatlantic security relationship. NATO will thus remain a most valuable 
alliance and an instrument to jointly address the perils of an interdependent world. 
However, in order to enhance an international liberal order conducive to U.S. 
interests and with regard to current institutional shortcomings, the United States 
should not entirely rely on NATO, but instead effectively combine power and 
cooperation. 
While these camps seem to differ profoundly in approach and outlook, they also 
display considerable overlaps in their argumentation that may provide room for 
consensus-building prior to the decisionmaking process. Carving out major 
differences and overlaps between the camps is considered necessary in order to 
‘weigh’ the different proposals and to point to major topics that are likely to determine 
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future U.S. NATO politics.283 In the following, this second step of the analysis will be 
performed.  
 
4. Differences and Overlaps 
 
In order to detect differences and overlaps between the camps’ argumentation, two 
steps need to be performed. First, the arguments concerning burden-sharing and 
NATO enlargement advanced by all four camps are compared. Second, by detecting 
considerable overlaps, the main arguments determining the current U.S. debate on 
NATO will be extracted. 
 
4.1 Comparison 
 
In the context of burden-sharing, all four camps point to European military weakness. 
The greatest difference in assessing the consequences of this weakness can be 
observed between the libertarian and neoconservative camps. Scholars from the 
libertarian Cato Institute point to the perils of European military weakness for U.S. 
security and strategic outlook. European freeriding will inevitably lead to U.S. decline. 
Instead, Europeans should be given the opportunity to develop their own capabilities 
outside of NATO so that the security dependence on the United States that has so 
far only bred resentment against it would end. Contrarily, neoconservative thinkers 
simply mock at European military weakness and do not assume that it will have a 
lasting impact on the U.S. strategic outlook.  
Conservatives share libertarian concerns about European freeriding on U.S. security 
guarantees. However, they take a different view on the conduct of U.S. security 
politics. In contrast to the libertarian camp, they do not believe that disengagement 
will prevent Europe from engaging in counterbalancing efforts. On the contrary, they 
argue that the United States needs to stay engaged in Europe in order to keep in 
check European balancing efforts that will inevitably occur if the assumptions of 
structural realism are consequently applied. A policy of disengagement would 
therefore expose the United States precisely to the security risks it should seek to 
actively confront. Instead, the United States must remain a ‘European power,’ keep 
                                                 
283 For a major overview of the arguments advanced by the four camps with regard to the issues of burden-
sharing and NATO enlargement, please see appendix.   
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an eye on European security developments, and influence them in a way that will 
serve U.S. interests and complement U.S. capabilities. In order to effectively counter 
the effects of European freeriding, the United States must work to enhance European 
military capacity, but only within the context of NATO. In contrast to libertarians who 
advocate a neo-isolationist approach and neoconservatives, who take a unilateralist 
stance on NATO, conservatives can thus be considered to advocate a more 
‘multilateralist’ approach and outlook.  
Liberals, in contrast to the other three camps, assess European military contributions 
more positively. However, in order to work on a new transatlantic bargain, liberals 
argue that Europeans need to upgrade their capabilities to stay interoperable with the 
United States. In the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the prospect that NATO 
may simply provide the United States with a “useful joint-training and exercise 
organization from which they can cherry-pick ‘coalitions of the willing’ to participate in 
U.S.-led operations”284 is strongly dismissed. Shaping up European militaries should 
not serve a U.S. security policy that, however multilateralist in approach, continues to 
focus on a narrowly-defined national interest and therefore engages in a ‘divide-and-
rule’ game. Instead, in order to counter complex international problems, NATO will 
need a strong and unified Europe to function.  
Notwithstanding these differences, except for neoconservatives, who remain largely 
indifferent vis-à-vis the impact of European military weakness on their own security 
policies, all camps argue that European military capabilities need to be shaped up 
substantially in order to serve U.S. security interests. While libertarians argue that 
Europe should do so outside of NATO, conservatives and liberals strongly advocate 
for European upgrades within the NATO structure.  
At this point, different assessments of NATO enlargement come into play. Again, 
libertarians are seriously concerned with the consequences that extending U.S. 
security guarantees into strategically irrelevant regions might entail, arguing that U.S. 
risk exposure will outweigh all potential benefits of NATO enlargement. In contrast, 
the remaining three camps assess NATO enlargement differently and judge it vital to 
maintain U.S. security interests.  
Neoconservatives are ignorant of NATO’s role in U.S. military policies; however, the 
league of democratic NATO countries will remain necessary to provide for 
                                                 
284 Kitfield, quoted in Daalder 2003, 156. 
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legitimization of U.S. action, no matter how enclosed in a Kantian world of ‘Perpetual 
Peace’ they are. In more general terms, NATO is also seen as a vehicle for extending 
U.S. hegemony to regions considered strategically relevant.  
By arguing to transform NATO into a political club of like-minded democracies, 
neoconservatives therefore emphasize the political benefits of NATO enlargement.  
In contrast to neoconservatives, conservative thinkers tend to emphasize both 
political and military benefits of NATO enlargement. In pointing to the political 
benefits, they assume that the United States and Europe are from the same planet, 
with the Western European states actively engaging in counterbalancing efforts. 
NATO enlargement will provide the United States with allies that are capable of 
forging a counterbalancing weight to Western Europe. At the same time, and in 
contrast to neoconservatives, conservatives also appreciate the military benefits of 
NATO’s maintenance and enlargement. If NATO can be transformed into a well-
equipped toolbox, Central and Eastern European states are most likely to act as 
future force-providers in ‘coalitions of the willing’ that will preferably be assembled 
within NATO. Although scholars of both perspectives look differently at the overall 
relevance of NATO enlargement, they emphasize its benefits, with conservative 
thinkers pointing to a certain necessity of even further enlarging NATO in order to 
amount more critical ‘pro-U.S. mass.’ 
Scholars with a neoliberal institutionalist perspective tend to be far more critical than 
conservative and neoconservative scholars about consolidating the benefits of NATO 
enlargement in terms of stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe and integrating these 
countries into the league of Western democracies. In arguing that multilateral 
organizations per se play a pivotal role in creating and maintaining an international 
order, they are simultaneously concerned with NATO’s current institutional 
shortcomings and address the question as to which kind of structures, processes, 
and practices make international institutions capable of affecting policies.285 In the 
context of NATO enlargement, liberal scholars are therefore anxious about how 
NATO’s political mechanisms need to be shaped in order to further consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law in Central and Eastern European countries. In contrast 
to neoconservative and conservative scholars, they closely focus on the institutional 
aspects of NATO enlargement instead of its geopolitical benefits. In general, 
                                                 
285 See Keohane 2002. 
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although they support NATO enlargement, they are far more sceptical vis-à-vis its 
pace and feasibility than conservatives and neoconservatives with regard to NATO’s 
institutional arrangements.  
 
4.2 Extracting the Main Lines of Argument 
 
Notwithstanding considerable differences in approach and argumentation, NATO’s 
military capabilities are considered insufficient especially by conservatives and 
liberals, who maintain that shaping up military capabilities constitutes a necessary 
component for NATO to remain relevant. Furthermore, neoconservatives, 
conservatives, and – with reservations – liberals argue that maintaining and enlarging 
NATO also holds major political benefits in store. Therefore, apart from scholars 
adopting a libertarian perspective, all camps argue that the United States must stay 
involved in European affairs and therefore in NATO. While conservatives and 
neoconservatives point to the geopolitical benefits of maintaining NATO, liberals 
argue that the United States’ extensive global ties and its vulnerability to outside 
forces make disengagement impossible.286  
Thus, neoconservatives, conservatives, and liberals come to a similar conclusion by 
taking different paths: All three camps seek to restructure the transatlantic security 
alliance to a certain extent. As Barry maintains, a variety of initiatives and bodies that 
also give important impetus to decisionmaking, serve as platforms for mutual 
consensus-building on how to work on this objective. The Committee to Expand 
NATO provides an instrument to carve out common lines of understanding between 
neoconservatives and liberals by bringing together several prominent 
neoconservatives, some of whom are serving in the Bush administration such as 
Paul Wolfowitz, along with Democrats such as Will Marshall, founder and president of 
the Progressive Policy Institute and the Democratic Leadership Council.287 Another 
forum for understanding is provided by the New Atlantic Initiative (NAI) promoted by 
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). NAI includes on its advisory board military 
hard-liners such as Donald Rumsfeld, right-wing political figures such as Newt 
Gingrich, as well as ‘realist’ Atlanticists such as Henry Kissinger.288  
                                                 
286 Daalder/Lindsay 2003a, 288. 
287 For a more extensive discussion see Barry 2004, online. 
288 Barry 2004, online. 
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Conservatives share the neoconservative emphasis on U.S. military power and the 
prospect of sustaining U.S. military primacy, and they overlap in defining a strategy of 
‘cherry-picking,’ if for different reasons. Liberals, on their part, agree with 
neoconservatives that the creation and maintenance of a liberal international order 
and the emphasis on democracy should constitute first order principles in U.S. 
foreign policy. However, despite considerable overlaps, liberals and conservatives 
also strongly criticize the neoconservative argument. Conservatives consider 
neoconservatives to be dangerously unbound in their ambition to ‘remake the world 
in their image’ by force, if necessary, and regard the assumption of unipolarity as a 
dangerous illusion. Liberals strongly criticize the neoconservative ignorance vis-à-vis 
NATO in adopting Joseph Nye’s argument that  
“[i]n the absence of international institutions through which others can feel 
consulted and involved, the imperial imposition of values may neither attract 
others nor produce soft power.”289 
In opposing libertarian and neoconservative assumptions and arguments, 
conservatives and liberals share room to coalesce. Furthermore, neither camp 
entirely rules out unilateral action, thus sharing further common ground. 
Conservatives, though preferring to work through NATO for assembling coalitions of 
the willing, argue that the United States may also do so outside NATO and, if 
necessary, should resort to unilateralist action. Liberals place premium importance on 
multinational organizations. However, when vital interests of the United States are 
touched upon or when multilateral arrangements interfere with the U.S. ability to 
produce stability and peace in volatile areas, the United States should be cautious to 
continue working through multilateralist arrangements. Despite maintaining that 
“unilateral actions are best when buttressed by multilateral support,”290 liberals also 
argue that à la carte multilateralism may indeed constitute a viable option to pursue 
U.S. foreign policy goals.291 Put more generally, while liberals do not agree with 
conservatives on transforming NATO into a mere toolbox, they admit that not every 
“problem has an international or multilateral solution (…). In fact, however, an 
effective foreign policy in the age of global politics must combine power and 
cooperation.”292 In brief, although they have different perspectives, both 
conservatives and liberals regard the maintenance of U.S. power as essential to the 
                                                 
289 Nye 2003, 67. 
290 Nye 2002, 159f. 
291 See Nye on this argument, 2002, 159. 
292 Daalder/Lindsay 2003a, 290, emphasis as in original. 
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United States’ ability to achieve its foreign policy goals. While both camps conclude 
that it is through cooperative efforts that the United States is most likely to achieve its 
foreign policy goals, they also maintain that multilateralism can only represent a 
means to achieve a certain end; if it fails to do so, the United States must resort to 
unilateral action as a last resort in pursuit of its national interest. 
In brief, this second step of analysis sought to extract areas with consensus-building 
power in the current U.S. debate on NATO. The findings revealed that, while major 
differences exist between the four perspectives dominant in the current U.S. think 
tank debate on NATO, major overlaps can also be detected. For different reasons, 
the neoconservative, conservative, and liberal camps advocate the continued 
relevance of NATO in political terms. Simultaneously, conservatives and liberals seek 
to enhance NATO’s military capabilities; while liberals argue that the United States 
will benefit from a strong Europe, conservatives maintain that specific niche 
capabilities need to be developed. Although NATO’s military relevance is seriously 
doubted by all camps except for the liberal one, its political capacities are regarded 
as being of continued importance. In criticizing the libertarian and neoconservative 
perspectives as being wildly off the mark, conservatives and liberals share most 
common ground in debating NATO. In this context, while both camps prefer working 
through NATO in addressing transatlantic security issues, both adopt an 
instrumentalist view to conducting U.S. multilateralist policies. However, both camps 
also reject the notion of following this multilateralist path in case it hamstrings the 
implementation of U.S. security policies or the pursuit of vital points on the U.S. 
agenda. Thus, a selective approach to NATO is likely to determine future U.S. 
decisionmaking considerations.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
 
This analysis looked into the U.S. security debate on NATO that has gained new 
impetus in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In order to capture the entire U.S. 
debate on NATO, this paper drew on the analyses of think tank fellows of ten 
different think tanks.  
By performing a qualitative analysis of the debate’s content, this study sought to 
reconstruct the different perspectives on NATO that are currently prevailing in the 
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United States. Drawing on earlier discussions, the analysis distinguished between 
four ‘camps’ that advance distinct policy analyses and recommendations to 
policymakers:  
Camp 1 Camp 2 Camp 3 Camp 4 
Libertarian Neoconservative Conservative Liberal 
In a first step, the major lines of argument were presented according to the issues of 
burden-sharing and NATO enlargement that are assessed differently by the 
respective camps. Additionally, policy recommendations advanced to U.S. 
policymakers were depicted. In a second step, the analysis carved out differences 
between the approaches, and - more importantly so - major overlaps that may give 
way to consensus-building in U.S. NATO politics.  
The findings of this analysis gain relevance in two major fields: First, they provide 
insight into the revitalized debate on NATO conducted in the United States. Second, 
they address an insufficiently-researched area in foreign policy analysis by looking at 
the input side of the decisionmaking process on the issue of NATO.  
1. This analysis explored the main lines of argument as well as the broad range of 
policy options advanced to decision-makers by the four camps. The findings can be 
summarized as follows.  
Libertarians adopt a structural realist approach. They maintain that NATO does not 
serve any purpose but to maintain U.S. hegemony in Europe. With regard to the 
inevitable logic of balance-of-power politics governing international relations, they 
point to the perils arising from an extended security parameter into strategically 
irrelevant regions, since this will provoke other powers into balancing behavior. 
Furthermore, European military freeriding will lead to gradual U.S. decline. Therefore, 
they advocate a strategic withdrawal from Europe.  
Neoconservatives meld the idea of prolonged hegemonic stability with the claim to 
conduct a ‘morally sound’ foreign policy. They consider NATO irrelevant as a military 
alliance. However, the alliance maintains relevance as a provider of legitimization for 
U.S. action. Therefore, it should be transformed into a ‘political club’ of like-minded 
democracies. 
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Conservatives argue that NATO enlargement serves to create an intra-European 
counter-weight to ‘Gaullist’ European states. Furthermore, Central and Eastern 
European states will act as force-providers for the conduct of ‘coalitions of the willing.’ 
In order to prevent Europe from engaging in freeriding, however, European 
capabilities need to be shaped up substantially within NATO. Conservatives therefore 
advocate for transforming NATO into a well-equipped toolbox.   
Liberals argue that in an interdependent world, multinational organizations play a 
pivotal role in creating an international liberal order. To strike a new transatlantic 
bargain, European NATO allies need to shape up militarily. In addition, institutional 
shortcomings need to be addressed to consolidate the benefits of the previous round 
of enlargement. Although liberals prefer working through multinational organizations, 
they also point to the need to combine power and cooperation. 
While – in contrast to libertarians – the neoconservative, conservative, and liberal 
camps advocate the importance of staying engaged in Europe, conservatives and 
liberals share most common ground.293 While both camps regard NATO as an 
instrument of continued relevance to pursue U.S. foreign policy goals in security 
politics, they remain, however, sceptical towards NATO’s capacities and do not rule 
out unilateral action either: Whereas conservatives disparagingly regard NATO as a 
‘necessary evil’ to pursue their security policies in Europe, liberals are especially 
doubtful regarding NATO’s institutional capacities to cope with an ever-increasing 
number of members with mixed political records.294  
Therefore, the United States will most likely continue to make use of NATO 
selectively. In this context “[e]ven most American multilateralists are unilateralists at 
the core.”295 U.S. policymakers and analysts mostly are not principled multilateralists, 
but instrumental multilateralists who see multilateralism in terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis rather than a primary principle guiding the conduct of policy. In brief, 
“[t]his blend of unilateralism and multilateralism reflects a broad and deep 
American consensus. Americans prefer to act with the sanction and support of 
the other countries if they can. But they’re strong enough to act alone if they 
must.”296 
 
                                                 
293 With regard to the unsustainability of exclusively unilateralist policies, Ikenberry heralds the “end of the 
neoconservative moment.” Ikenberry 2004. 
294 Singer 2003, online. 
295 Kagan 2002C, online. 
296 Kagan 2002C, online. On account of this argument see also Nelson 2002, 56; Haftendorn 2003. 
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Therefore, also a potential change of administration in the context of U.S. presidential 
elections will not necessarily herald a fundamental change in the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy. While the language employed may be more considerate and the 
general willingness to work through NATO may be enhanced due to the influence of 
more liberal policy advocates, U.S. cautiousness vis-à-vis NATO as a multilateral 
institution will likely prevail, given current trends in the U.S. debate on NATO.  
2. The findings of this analysis also entail a range of theoretical implications that can 
be identified. This study is considered a first and necessary step in addressing an 
insufficiently-researched topic pointing to the input provided by think tanks into the 
foreign policymaking process. However, as Abelson points out, 
“despite preliminary efforts (…) to examine the role of think-tanks in the policy-
making process, the study of policy research institutions and their involvement 
in foreign policy decision-making is far from complete.”297 
While this analysis is rather concerned with what is being discussed in the U.S, thus 
focusing on the content of the think tank debate, follow-up studies will have to point 
to the question of how the respective arguments and policy recommendations will 
actually be integrated into the policymaking process.  
Recent studies have already attempted to measure the actual impact of think tank 
analyses on policymaking; however, these analyses remain rather quantitative in 
nature and try to amount empirical evidence for policy impact in general. Therefore, a 
follow-up study may draw on the findings of this study in order to track the different 
lines of argument in the policymaking process, thus gaining insight into the extent to 
which think tanks can actually serve as mediators prior to the decisionmaking 
processes. Furthermore, by tracking the content of a specific issue in the 
policymaking process, further studies may also focus on how and by which strategies 
think tanks manage to have influence on specific policy issues. As Abelson 
concludes, 
“[b]y examining the participation of think-tanks in the policy-making process, political 
scientists can provide a more comprehensive explanation of how policy decisions are 
shaped and moulded in Washington. (…) In studying the policy-making environment, 
political scientists must be cognizant of the changing role of think-tanks in the United 
States.”298   
 
 
                                                 
297 Abelson 1996, 124. 
298 Abelson 1996, 125. 
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APPENDIX 
  
Burden-Sharing 
 
NATO Enlargement 
 
Policy 
Recommendations 
Libertarians 
 
- NATO useless as 
a military alliance  
- Danger of 
European freeriding 
through security 
guarantee by the 
U.S. that will 
eventually weaken 
the U.S. 
- Danger of extending 
security guarantees to 
strategically 
insignificant regions 
- Danger of getting 
‘bogged down’ in small 
and strategically 
insignificant wars and 
peacekeeping missions 
- U.S. strategic 
withdrawal from NATO 
- Integration of Central 
and Eastern Europe via 
international economic 
institutions 
Neo-
conservatives 
 
- NATO is entirely 
insignificant in 
military terms; as an 
alliance, it is not 
needed either 
because of U.S. 
prevalence  
 
 
- NATO remains a 
vehicle for securing 
U.S. hegemony in 
Europe and extending it 
to strategically 
significant regions 
(Turkey, Russia, 
Central Asia) 
- NATO can be used as 
a vehicle to gain 
political legitimization 
for U.S. action, 
especially from Central 
an Eastern European 
countries 
Transforming NATO into 
a ‘political club’ of no 
military significance  
Conservatives 
 
- NATO is useless 
as an alliance 
because of 
European military 
weakness 
- Europeans cannot 
be allowed to 
continue to free-ride 
on U.S. security 
guarantee 
- NATO remains a vital 
instrument for the U.S. 
to remain a ‘European 
power’ and prevent 
European balancing 
- U.S. should keep in 
touch with Central and 
Eastern European 
states to form 
‘coalitions of the willing” 
within NATO  
Transforming NATO into 
a well-equipped toolbox 
(force-provider of niche  
capabilities); cherry-
picking 
 
Liberals 
 
- Europeans 
contribute to 
missions, also in 
military terms, 
especially in the 
peacekeeping and 
nation-building fields
- To work on a new 
transatlantic 
agenda, capabilities 
must be upgraded 
- NATO enlargement 
guarantees for a 
Europe ‘whole and free’
- To consolidate this 
achievement, 
institutional 
shortcomings must be 
addressed 
Striking a new 
transatlantic bargain in 
military and political 
terms 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
AEI  American Enterprise Institute 
 
ANP     Annual National Program 
 
CJTF     Combined Joint Task Force 
 
CSIS  Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
DCI        Defense Capabilities Initiative 
 
EU    European Union  
 
ESDP    European Security and Defense Policy 
 
IPS  Institute for Policy Studies 
 
ISAF     International Security and Assistance Force 
 
MAP   Membership Action Plan 
 
NAC     North Atlantic Council 
 
NAT      New Atlantic Initiative 
 
NATO      North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
NRF      NATO Response Force 
 
PfP  Partnership for Peace 
 
PPI         Progressive Policy Institute 
 
UN         United Nations 
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